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INTRODUCTION

The New Jersey Antitrust Act, ("the Act") has now turned
twenty-five. As befits a citizen of that age, the Act has matured
greatly. This Article will look back on the law already developed
under the Act and ahead to issues still remaining. 2 Special attention will be given to the effect of federal antitrust law upon the Act
and any differences that have emerged between federal and New
Jersey law.
Initially, it must be emphasized that while New Jersey courts
have published a number of far-reaching opinions under the Act
(and several important unpublished decisions)' in its first twentyfive years, section 56:9-18 requires that the Act, at least as to substantive rather than procedural law, "be construed in harmony with4
judicial interpretations of comparable Federal antitrust statutes."
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-1 et seq. (West 1989). The Act became effective on May
21, 1970.
2 Two early surveys of the Act provide some useful background. See generally
Michael J. Perrucci & Joseph A. Mussomeli, New Jersey Antitrust Law: An Overiew, 2
SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 134 (1977) (emphasizing enforcement of Act by State); LionelJ.
Frank, An Overview of the New Jersey Antitrust Act, 108 N.J.L.J. 293 (1981). For a general
overview of the Act, see Arthur R. Schmauder & Francis R. Sheehan, Antitrust Overview
for the General Practitioner,139 N.J. LAw. 18 (1991).
3 See, e.g., Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., Superior Court of
New Jersey, Chancery Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. ATL-C-000052-89E
(March 25, 1993).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-18 requires that the Act "be construed in harmony with
ruling judicial interpretations of comparable Federal antitrust statutes and to effectuate, insofar as practicable, a uniformity in the laws of those states which enact [the
Act]." See Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 140,
186-87, 659 A.2d 904, 926 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A.2d 1197 (1995)
("[O]ur antitrust statute should be construed in consonance with federal law."). But
see Belmar v. Cipolla, 96 N.J. 199, 219, 475 A.2d 533, 544 (1984) (noting without
resolving potential conflict between federal and New Jersey law concerning standard
governing tying arrangements). Even as to substantive issues, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey has not considered itself bound to obey the decisions of lower federal
courts where the supporting reasoning for those decisions appears "cursory." In
Pomanowski, the court found that several such decisions "lack[ed] persuasive force
and amount[ed] to no more than a respected source of opinion." Pomanowski, 89 N.J.
at 314 n.3, 446 A.2d at 87 n.3. Though such a result accords with the normal rule
that state courts are not bound by, but should give respect to, the opinions of intermediate federal courts even on issues of federal law, Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
121 N.J. 69, 79-80, 577 A.2d 129, 143-44 (1990), it is cause to wonder whether section
56:9-18 has any effect whatsoever. See Perrucci & Mussomeli, supra note 2, at 141, 151
n.103 ("Section 18 cannot give federal precedent a stare decisis effect on the state act,
but the section does show a legislative intent to seek uniformity.... Section 18, however, should not be interpreted as giving post-enactmentfederal case law a stare decisis
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Thus, analysis of New Jersey's treatment of antitrust issues will
often involve a discussion of federal law. 5
In summary, the Act prohibits illegal restraints of trade and
monopolies. Specifically, New Jersey section 56:9-3 parallels § 1 of
the federal Sherman Act 6 and provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce, in this State, shall be unlawful." Section
56:9-4(a), which is comparable to § 2 of the Sherman Act, 7 provides that it shall be unlawful for "any person to monopolize or
attempt to monopolize, or to combine or conspire with any person
or persons, to monopolize trade or commerce in any relevant market within this State." Prior to discussing New Jersey's treatment of
alleged restraints of trade and monopolies, however, a general discussion of the purposes and fundamental concepts under the Act is
appropriate.
II.

A.

THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT

Protectingthe Public

Like its federal antitrust counterpart, the Sherman Act,' the
purpose of the Act is to ensure that the public obtains "the benefits
ordinarily derived from a competitive market."9 Though a private
effect on state courts," because that could constitute unlawful delegation of state
power to another sovereign).
Decisions of other state courts are rarely relied upon in cases under the Act,
despite the statement of section 56:9-18 that such cases are as persuasive as federal
authorities. However, in Pomanowski, the Supreme Court of NewJersey found "useful"
"other state court decisions construing state antitrust acts in accordance with federal
interpretations of the Sherman Act." 89 N.J. at 314, 446 A.2d at 87. Pomanowski and
Ideal Dairy are among the only cases under the Act to cite decisions under other state
antitrust statutes.

The New Jersey Appellate Division has made clear that the requirement of section 56:9-18 governs only substantive, rather than procedural, law. See Boardwalk
Properties,253 N.J. Super. at 529, 602 A.2d at 740 (quotation omitted); see also infra
notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
5 See RobertJ. Clark, Antitrust Law in New Jersey After Lawn King, 108 NJ.L.J. 1, 9
(1981) ("Most antitrust cases are decided in the federal courts, and most antitrust
'enforcement' occurs in attorneys' offices, where sensitivity to federal precedents
abounds."). Where a discussion of federal law is appropriate this article emphasizes
decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit.
6 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
7 15 U.S.C. § 2.
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
9 Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., 253 N.J. Super. 515, 530,
602 A.2d 733, 741 (App. Div. 1991); see also Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 68, 88, 401 A.2d 722, 732 (Law Div. 1979) (quoting
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 361 F. Supp. 774, 778 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd,
481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973)), affd, 176 N.J. Super.
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litigant may benefit financially from an antitrust suit, "the overriding purpose of the Act is to advance the public policy in favor of
competition." 10 Absent harm to competition, the fact that a challenged restraint injures an individual competitor is "irrelevant." 1
Stated another way, the antitrust laws were enacted for "the
protection of competition not competitors." 2 In language equally
applicable to the Act, the United States Supreme Court explained:
The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses
from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from
the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct
which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not
out of solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the
public interest.'"
Because the protection of the public is the central focus of the
Act, even illegal conduct by an antitrust plaintiff (provided the conduct is unrelated to the antitrust laws) will not bar a private antitrust suit that benefits the public.' 4 Such a rule is necessary
because enforcement of the antitrust laws outweighs punishing a
potential antitrust plaintiff for its wrongdoing, especially where
that plaintiff may be the only party with standing to bring suit.1 5
B.

EncouragingInterbrand Competition

The public benefits from the existence of interbrand competition, that is, competition among entities manufacturing or distributing similar products. 6 In the television market, Sony and RCA
are examples of companies engaged in interbrand competition.
320, 423 A.2d 311 (App. Div. 1980) (explaining that the antitrust laws are designed to
preserve competition among sellers and to "'prevent unreasonably high prices to the
purchasers and users' of the goods or services in question").
10 Boardwalk Properties,253 N.J. Super. at 530, 602 A.2d at 741 (citations omitted).
11 Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 140, 176,
659 A.2d 904, 920-21 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A.2d 1197 (1995).
12 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
13 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillen, 113 S. Ct. 884, 891-92 (1993).
14 Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc., 180 N.J. Super. 6, 19, 433 A.2d 780, 787
(App. Div. 1981) (rejecting application of clean hands doctrine to antitrust suit);
Health Corp. of America, Inc., v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 931, 932-34
(D.N.J. 1977) (rejecting clean hands application to claims under both the Act and
Sherman Act).
15 Glasofer, 180 N.J. Super. at 17, 433 A.2d at 786.
16 See State v. Lawn King, 84 N.J. 179, 194, 417 A.2d 1025, 1033 (1980); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977); Monmouth ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., v. Chrysler Corp., 102 N.J. 485, 497, 509 A.2d 161, 167 (1986) (citation omitted) ("The central focus of modem antitrust analysis is the recognition that
business efficiency and interbrand competition enhance consumer welfare.").
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Significant interbrand competition often results in lower prices
and more choices for the consumer.
In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between distributors of the same product of a particular manufacturer. 7 In the tire market, two Goodyear dealers located in the
same general vicinity are engaged in intrabrand competition.
Encouraging interbrand competition is the major concern of
the antitrust laws because such competition limits the potential for
consumer exploitation. 8 In Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 9 justice Powell explained:
The degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of
the level of interbrand competition confronting the manufacturer. Thus, there may be fierce intrabrand competition among
the distributors of a product produced by a monopolist and no
intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product
produced by a firm in a highly competitive industry. But when
interbrand competition exists, as it does among television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to
substitute a different brand of the same product. 20
Because interbrand competition is necessary to protect the
consumer, agreements among competitors restricting such competition (known as horizontal restraints) ,21 such as agreements to allocate customers and territories, are deemed per se illegal without
any analysis of the alleged competitive justification for the restraint. 2 In contrast, certain non-price agreements between a
manufacturer and its distributors (known as vertical restraints),
such as those granting exclusive sales territories, are analyzed
under a reasonableness standard because these restraints may en2
courage interbrand competition. 1
17

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.

18 Id.
19

433 U.S. 36 (1977).

Id. at 52 n.19.
See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730
(1988) (footnote omitted) ("Restraints imposed by agreement between competitors
have traditionally been denominated as horizontal restraints, and those imposed by
agreement between firms at different levels of distribution as vertical restraints.").
22 Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 140, 17778, 659 A.2d 904, 921-22 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A.2d 1197 (1995);
see also infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
23 State v. Lawn King, 84 N.J. 179, 194-95, 417 A.2d 1025, 1033-34 (1980); see also
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-52 ("The market impact of vertical restrictions is complex
because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition
20
21
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RESTRANT OF TRADE

The vast majority of antitrust claims under the Act arise under
section 56:9-3, which provides that "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce, in this State, shall be unlawful." Unilateral action,
even if designed to harm a competitor, will not violate section 56:93.24 Instead, "there must exist a plurality of actors, that is, two or
more persons, and concerted action."2 5 As a result, a corporation
cannot conspire with its officers or employees acting in the normal
course of business.2 6 Moreover, even if parties charge the same
price for similar goods or engage in other similar conduct, an antitrust violation will not exist unless there is some evidence of concerted activity.2 7 This is so even if the parties know that they are
acting similarly to each other, a condition known as "conscious
parallelism."2"
As noted above, section 56:9-3 bars "every" contract in restraint of trade. Despite this broad language, which would outlaw
virtually every commercial contract, the Act prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade.2 9 There are two principal methods of
evaluating whether a restraint of trade is unreasonable: the "per
se" rule and the "rule of reason." °
and stimulation of interbrand competition."); infra notes 138-52 and accompanying
text.
24 See Exxon Corp. v. Wagner, 154 N.J. Super. 538, 545, 382 A.2d 45, 48 (App. Div.
1977) (holding that Exxon's unilateral termination of a service station lease did not
violate the Act).
25 Id., 382 A.2d at 48.
26 Id.; see also Petrocco v. Dover Gen. Hosp. and Medical Ctr., 273 N.J. Super. 501,
524-25, 642 A.2d 1016, 1028 (App. Div.) (rejecting antitrust claims against hospital
because "a hospital is incapable of conspiring with its staff in deciding whether to
grant staff privileges"), certif denied, 138 N.J. 264, 649 A.2d 1284 (1994). This decision
accords with the federal rule. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (concerning federal antitrust act).
27 See Lawn King, 84 N.J. at 207, 417 A.2d at 1040 (citation omitted); see also Chick's
Auto Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 68, 86-87, 401 A.2d 722,
731 (Law Div. 1979), afrd, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (App. Div. 1980).
28 Chick's Auto Body, 168 N.J. Super. at 86, 401 A.2d at 731.
29 Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 89 N.J. 306, 315, 446 A.2d
83, 87 (1982) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911))
(other citations omitted). If § 56:9-3 were strictly construed to bar every restraint of
trade, it would "outlaw the entire body of private contract law." National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). This is necessarily
true because virtually every commercial contract, whether it is a restrictive covenant
or a franchise agreement, restrains trade in some fashion. Id.
30 Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 140, 175,
659 A.2d 904, 920 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A.2d 1197 (1995). In
addition to the per se rule and the rule of reason, courts have recognized an interme-
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The Per Se Rule

Per se analysis applies to "plainly anticompetitive conduct"
that courts have presumed is always harmful to competition."1
Once challenged conduct is characterized as a per se violation, it is
"conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm [it has] caused or
the business excuse for [its] use." 2 Examples of conduct traditionally (though not always) analyzed under the per se rule are price
fixing, horizontal restraints, tying arrangements, group boycotts,
and bid rigging. 3
An antitrust plaintiff employing the per se rule "need only
prove the existence of the illegal agreement and anticompetitive
intent on the part of defendant."" The plaintiff is not required to
demonstrate that the concerted activity actually harmed competition. That harm is presumed by the very nature of the act, such as
35
price fixing.
diate approach to analyzing antitrust claims known at the "quick look" rule. Id. at
179, 659 A.2d at 922; United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)).
The quick look rule is designed to mitigate the harshness of applying the per se rule.
In Ideal Dairy, the appellate division explained that even "inherently suspect" activity
may pass antitrust muster if the defendant can offer legitimate justifications for the
restraint:
In "quick look" cases, a court determines that the challenged restraint,
although inherently suspect, should not necessarily be regarded as illegal per se. Although the court presumes anticompetitive effect, it nonetheless will balance this adverse effect against any procompetitive
justification advanced by defendant. If defendant can offer no legitimate justifications for the restraint, the presumption of anticompetitive
effect prevails without a detailed market analysis showing the restraint
to be harmful. If defendant can offer a legitimate justification, a fullscale rule of reason test will be utilized, requiring a detailed market
analysis.
Id. at 179-80, 659 A.2d at 922. The court declined to employ "quick look," id. at 192,
659 A.2d at 929, and it is not yet clear when that rule should be applied.
31 Id. at 177-78, 659 A.2d at 921-22.
32 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
33 Ideal Dairy, 282 N.J. Super. at 177-78, 659 A.2d at 921-22 . Courts consider the
per se rule beneficial because it "provide [s] guidance to the business community and
minimizes the burden on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex ruleof-reason trials." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16
(1977). Moreover, condemning a given restraint as per se illegal acknowledges the
reality that "[j]udges often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice's effect on competition." Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (citation
omitted). Tying arrangements may no longer be in the per se category. See infra
notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
34 Ideal Dairy, 282 N.J. Super. at 178, 659 A.2d at 922.
35 See id. at 186, 659 A.2d at 926 . Very few published cases under the Act have
employed the per se rule. See, e.g., Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J.
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The Rule of Reason

In most cases, particularly where the issue is "novel and complex," 6 NewJersey courts apply the rule of reason analysis to determine whether concerted action is "unreasonable" and, therefore,
violates section 56:9-3. 1 Unlike per se rule cases, where anti-competitive effects are presumed, 8 courts applying the rule of reason
focus on whether the "challenged conduct adversely affects competition."3 9 Factors a court may consider include "the circumstances
peculiar to the defendant's business, the conditions before and after the restraint, and the nature of the restraint and its effects,
either actual or probable, on competition."4' Once a plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged restraint adversely affects competition, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer proof that its
conduct was procompetitive.41
In Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Board of Realtors," the New
Jersey Supreme Court explained that the rule of reason involves a
balancing test:
The rule [of reason] envisions a balancing process that scrutinizes the competitive significance of a given practice: if the
procompetitive benefits of that practice exceed any anti-competitive effects, the restraint will pass muster under the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, and likewise under N.J.S.A. 56:9-3. This balancing process calls for two steps: first, a definition of the relevant market or markets in which the questioned restraint
operates; and second, an evaluation of the "evils" inherent in
the challenged practice and a weighing of those anti-competitive
influences against any procompetitive justifications.4 3
Thus, the first step in evaluating a case under the rule of reaSuper. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (Ch. Div. 1972); Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple
Listing Serv., Inc., 113 N.J. Super. 371, 273 A.2d 795 (Ch.Div. 1971).
36 Belmar v. Cipolla, 96 N.J. 199, 219, 475 A.2d 533, 544 (1984).
37 Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 89 N.J. 306, 315, 446 A.2d
83, 87 (1982); Ideal Daiy, 282 N.J. Super. at 177, 659 A.2d at 904 ("The rule of reason
has become the *prevailing standard of analysis' in [Sherman Act] §1 cases... [and
t] he [United States] Supreme Court has made clear that departure from this standard
should be based on 'demonstrable economic effect rather than ...upon formalistic
line drawing.'") (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59).
38 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
39 Ideal Dairy, 282 N.J. Super at 176, 659 A.2d at 920; see also Pomanowski, 89 N.J. at
315, 446 A.2d at 87.
40 Ideal Dairy, 282 N.J. Super. at 176, 659 A.2d at 921
41 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
42 89 NJ. 306, 446 A.2d 83 (1982).
43 Id. at 315-16, 446 A.2d at 88.
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son is to identify the relevant market.4 4 A discussion of the principles involved in that process follows.
1.

Defining the Relevant Market

A relevant market is composed of geographic market and
product market components. 45 Analysis of the geographic market
often focuses on the conduct of the buyer, not the seller.4 6 The
Third Circuit has explained:
[T]he geographic market is not comprised of the region in
which the seller attempts to sell its product, but rather is comprised of the area where his customers would look to buy such a
product. Further, the size of the relevant geographic market
will differ depending upon the price, durability and size of the
product; in practical terms, one would comparison shop in a
larger geographic market for a tractor, as compared to a grocery
item.
Expert testimony is generally necessary to prove a geographic
market. 48 A party's failure to prove a geographic market will doom
its antitrust claims. 49 For example, in Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v.
BPHC Acquisition, Inc.,5° defendants filed a third-party complaint
that alleged, among other things, that Donald Trump had restrained trade in a geographic market of Atlantic City described as
the "Central Boardwalk Market." According to defendants, that
market included an area comprising only three of the many hotel/
casinos in Atlantic City, and excluded a number of hotel/casinos
44 See Ideal Dairy, 282 NJ. Super. at 176, 659 A.2d at 921; Boardwalk Properties,
Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. ATL-C-)00052-89E, slip op. at 65 (March 25, 1993) ("No
one disputes that a market definition is a critical step in an antitrust analysis and must
be undertaken even before one can evaluate the impact of conduct claimed to have
been wrongful.").
45 Ideal Dairy, 282 NJ. Super. at 176, 659 A.2d at 921.
46 Boardwalk Properties,slip op. at 63 (quoting Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical
Serv. Ass'n of Pa., 745 F.2d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985))
(stating that the geographic market is " ' the area in which a buyer may rationally look
for the goods and services he or she seeks"').
47 Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 726 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 3034 (1992).
48 Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 975 F.2d 1550
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 122 (1993). But seeExxon Corp. v. Wagner, 154
N.J. Super. 538, 547-48, 382 A.2d 45, 49 (App. Div. 1977) ("assum[ing]" that Red
Bank, NewJersey, was the relevant geographic market as asserted by antitrust plaintiff,
and granting summary judgment dismissing claim).
49 See Belmar v. Cipolla, 96 N.J. 99, 218, 475 A-2d 533, 543 (1984) (dismissing tying
claim against a hospital because, among other reasons, plaintiffs "offered no evidence
of the market area for anesthesiological services").
50 253 N.J Super. 515, 602 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1991).
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within walking distance. After a lengthy trial, the court rejected
defendants' claimed geographic market and dismissed their antitrust claims. The court principally relied on the fact that casino
customers could easily visit other casinos outside the alleged Cen51
tral Boardwalk Market.
In addition to proving a geographic market, an antitrust plaintiff must also define and prove the product market. The Third Circuit has recognized that a product market consists of those
"commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes." 52 Moreover, commodities in a product market are
"characterized by a cross-elasticity of demand.... [I] n other words,
the rise in the prices of a good within a relevant product market
would tend to create a greater demand for the other like goods in
53
that market.
Only one published New Jersey decision, Exxon Corp. v. Wagner,' has rejected a plaintiff's proposed product market. In Exxon,
a terminated service station lessee asserted that Exxon had monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market in Exxon products. 55 The appellate division held that the lessee's product market
definition failed because "Exxon products are not unique and are
56
interchangeable with those of other petroleum suppliers."
Once the relevant geographic and product markets are defined, an antitrust plaintiff in a case governed by the rule of reason
must demonstrate that competition, notjust an individual competi57
tor, has been harmed by the challenged conduct.
2.

Demonstrating Anticompetitive Effects

Proving anticompetitive effects requires a showing that the defendant controlled or manipulated the relevant market.5" Simply
stated, the antitrust plaintiff must prove that the concerted activity
adversely "affected the prices, quantity or quality 'of goods or
51 Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. ATL-C-000052-89E, slip op. at
65 (March 25, 1993).
52 Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399 (1956)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992).
53 Id. at 722.
54 154 N.J. Super. 538, 382 A.2d 45 (App. Div. 1977).
55 Id. at 542, 382 A.2d at 47.
56 Id. at 548-49, 382 A.2d at 50.
57 See Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 140,
188, 659 A.2d 904, 927 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A.2d 1197 (1995).
58 Id. at 189, 659 A.2d at 927.
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services."'"9
These principles were discussed at length in Ideal Dairy Farms,
Inc. v. FarmlandDairy Farms,Inc.6' Ideal, a milk distributor, alleged,
among other things, that Farmland, a milk processor, and its distributors violated the Act because they purportedly conspired to
drive Ideal out of business.6" The trial court concluded that Farmland's conduct constituted a per se violation of the Act and
awarded Ideal compensatory and punitive damages exceeding $2.8
million.62

The appellate division reversed. Finding that the trial court
should have applied the rule of reason instead of the per se rule,6"
the appellate division held that Ideal's "failure to provide market
analysis evidence and proof of injury to competition was fatal to its
antitrust claim." 64 The court explained that even a party's efforts
to destroy a competitor could not sustain an antitrust claim without
proof that competition was harmed:
Relying at trial on the per se theory, Ideal offered no market
analysis of the milk industry in the relevant geographic area and
presented no evidence that Farmland's conduct had the ability
to control and manipulate the market to the detriment of competition generally. Neither did Ideal offer proof of Farmland's
market power as an alternative to proof of actual or probable
anticompetitive effect. To the contrary, the record clearly shows
that Farmland competed in the same market as Tuscan, a major
processor, and that Farmland was involved in ongoing and
heated competition with Tuscan for retail customers at every
level. There was nothing in the proofs to indicate that Farmland had the ability to control and manipulate the milk
65
market.
One lesson of Ideal Dairy is that antitrust plaintiffs should not
place all their eggs in one basket and fail to introduce proofs of
59 Tunis, 952 F.2d at 728 (quotation omitted). Because of the difficulty in proving
anticompetitive effects in certain cases, however, courts "may allow proof of defendant's market power in lieu of proof of actual or probable anticompetitive effects."
Ideal Dairy,282 N.J. Super. at 188, 659 A.2d at 927. A defendant has market power if it

"has the ability to raise prices above those that would prevail in a competitive market."

Id.

60 282 N.J. Super. 140, 659 A.2d 904 (App. Div.), certif denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A.2d
1197 (1995).
61 Ideal Daiy, 282 N.J. Super. at 152, 659 A.2d at 909.
62 Id. at 155-56, 659 A.2d at 911.
63 Id. at 180-81, 659 A.2d at 923.
64
65

Id. at 190, 659 A.2d at 928.
Id. at 189, 659 A.2d at 927-28.
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anticompetitive effects 66 in anything but the clearest per se case.6

C.

7

Substantive Antitrust Violations

After the proper method of analysis is selected (per se, rule of
reason, or "quick look" 68 ), the court will then focus on the substantive antitrust violation alleged. New Jersey courts have confronted
a variety of substantive issues under the Act.
1.

Illegal Tying

A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one
product (the tying product) to a buyer on the condition that the
buyer also purchases another product (the tied product)69 Tying
arrangements are disfavored because the seller is able to advance
sales in the tied product for reasons other than the product's competitive merits.7 To commit a tying violation, the seller must have
"'appreciable economic power"' in the tying product market and
the arrangement must affect a substantial volume of commerce in
71
the tied market.
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that coercion is the fundamental element of a tying claim:
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement
lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that
the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to
purchase elsewhere on different terms. When such "forcing" is
66 The record indicates that Ideal "lost some of the most important records pertaining to damages while the case was pending." Id. at 155, 659 A.2d at 911. Thus,
counsel may not have had any evidence of anticompetitive effects available.
67 See Belmar v. Cipolla, 96 N.J. 199, 218-19, 475 A.2d 533, 543 (1984) (dismissing
antitrust claim because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that consumers were harmed
by alleged tying arrangement); Monmouth Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Manville Foodland, Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 262, 271-72, 482 A.2d 186, 191 (App. Div. 1984) (rejecting
an antitrust claim against a supermarket because "even assuming a predominant purpose to reduce competition by eliminating a competitor," plaintiffs offered no "relevant market data" and no evidence showing how competition was harmed), certif.
denied, 99 N.J. 234, 491 A.2d 722 (1985); Finlay & Assoc., Inc. v. Borg-Warner, Corp.,
146 N.J. Super. 210, 229, 369 A.2d 541, 551 (Law Div. 1976) (dismissing antitrust
claim because terminated distributor presented no evidence demonstrating "harm to
the trade in the area, to competition, or to the general public"), affd, 155 N.J. Super.
331, 382 A.2d 933 (App. Div.), certif denied, 77 N.J. 467, 391 A.2d 483 (1978).
68 For a discussion of the new "quick look" standard, which has not yet been applied in New Jersey, see supra note 30.
69 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992).
70 State v. Lawn King, 84 N.J. 179, 209, 417 A.2d 1025, 1041 (1980).
71 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462 (quoting Former Enters., Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
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present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied
item is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.72
Several New Jersey cases have analyzed tying arrangements
under the Act. In Belmar v. Cipolla,7s certain anesthesiologists alleged that a hospital's exclusive contract with an anesthesiological
group constituted an illegal tying arrangement. 74 According to
plaintiffs, the hospital "unlawfully tied the sale of other hospital
services, particularly surgery (the tying service), to the sale of anesthesiological services (the tied service) ." 7 Noting that plaintiffs
had offered little if any market data,76 the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate division's dismissal of plaintiffs' restraint of trade claim. Relying heavily on Jefferson Parish Hospital
DistrictNo. 2 v. Hyde,7 7 the court explained that plaintiffs had failed
to demonstrate that the public, not just plaintiffs themselves as
competitors, had been harmed by the exclusive contract:
Under the New Jersey Antitrust Act, application of the rule of
reason requires analysis of the competitive and anti-competitive
effect of the challenged practice under all relevant circumstances.78 Such an analysis requires insight into the economics
of the industry to determine whether a given restraint is unreasonable. The record before us, which contains nothing more
than a cryptic statement of the market share and some abstract
testimony about alternative methods of providing anesthesiology, fails to provide any such insight.... This record is devoid of
proof that patients were forced to purchase the services of de72

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).

96 NJ. 199, 475 A.2d 533 (1984).
Id. at 206, 475 A.2d at 537. Tying arrangements have been analyzed under both
the per se rule and the rule of reason. See discussion infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text; see also Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1574
(11th Cir. 1991) (discussing when each test is applied), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 295
(1992).
75 Belmar, 96 N.J. at 212, 475 A.2d at 540.
76 Plaintiff alleged that the tying arrangement was a per se violation of the Act. Id.
77 466 U.S. 2 (1984). That case had been decided shortly before Belmar.
78 Belmar, 96 N.J. at 218, 475 A.2d at 543 (citation omitted). While noting that the
United States Supreme Court had applied a per se rule in Jefferson Parish, the New
Jersey Supreme Court applied the rule of reason consistent with Pomanowski and Lawn
King. Id. at 219, 475 A.2d at 544. The court explained that per se treatment of the
alleged tie was unnecessary because it was not "manifestly anti-competitive and devoid
of redeeming virtue." Id., 475 A.2d at 543. The court made clear in Belmar, however,
as it did in subsequent cases, that it had not decided whether the rule of reason
should be applied in an antitrust action growing out of hospital privilege arrangements. See id., 475 A.2d at 544; Desai v. St. Barnabas Medical Ctr., 103 NJ. 79, 98-99,
510 A.2d 662, 672 (1986); Petrocco v. Dover Gen. Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 273 N.J.
Super. 501, 524, 642 A.2d 1016, 1028 (App. Div.), certif denied, 138 N.J. 264, 649 A.2d
1284 (1994).
73
74
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fendant doctors as the result of the hospital's market power.79
An alleged illegal tying arrangement was also at issue in State v.
Lawn King. 0 There, the State of NewJersey brought various criminal charges under the Act against the corporate franchisor of an
automated lawn care maintenance service ("Lawn King") and its
president alleging, among other things, that Lawn King improperly
required its franchisees to purchase chemicals and seeds from
either a Lawn King distributor or an approved source. 1
In affirming the appellate division's reversal of all convictions,
the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the complexity of
the franchisor/franchisee relationship mandated use of the rule of
reason, not the per se rule applied by the trial court. s2 Under that
analysis, the supreme court agreed with the appellate division that
the charges should be dismissed because the state failed to demonstrate that Lawn King's alleged product tie was unreasonable.8 3
In Belmar and Lawn King, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to analyze tying arrangements. In both
cases, the tying claims were rejected because no evidence of public
harm was introduced. In light of these decisions, despite the traditional federal rule that tying arrangements will be considered per
se illegal, 4 parties litigating tying claims under the Act should assume that tying claims will require proof that competition was adversely affected, at least where the issues surrounding the tying
arrangements may be considered novel or complex, as in Belmar
and Lawn King.
2.

Group Boycott/Refusals to Deal

A group boycott involves "'concerted action with a purpose
either to exclude a person or group from the market, or to accomplish some other anti-competitive object, or both."'8 5 Tradition79 Belmar, 96 NJ. at 218, 475 A.2d at 543 . Compounding their failure to prove
that competition was harmed, plaintiffs "offered no evidence of the market area for
anesthesiological services." Id.
80 84 NJ. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980).
81 Id. at 186, 417 A.2d at 1029. The state also alleged that defendants engaged in
price fixing or resale price maintenance and improper vertical and horizontal territorial restraints. Id. at 187-88, 417 A.2d at 1029-30.
82 Id. at 210-13, 417 A.2d at 1042-43. The court also noted that the rule of reason
was especially appropriate in a criminal prosecution because the courts should "proceed with even greater caution" in such cases. Id. at 212, 417 A.2d at 1043.
83 Id. at 213, 417 A.2d at 1043 (citation omitted).
84 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).
85 Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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ally, group boycotts have been analyzed under the per se rule. 6
However, application of the per se rule in this context has engendered considerable confusion,8 7 thereby suggesting that NewJersey
courts may simply use the rule of reason. 8
NewJersey courts have considered several group boycott cases.

In Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Auto Insurance Co.,89 plaintiffs, a
group of automobile body repair shops, alleged, among other
things, that defendants, various automobile insurance companies,
participated in a group boycott in connection with the resolution
of certain insurance claims.90 Essentially, the rates plaintiffs
charged consumers for repairs exceeded the standard rates approved by the insurance companies, thereby leaving consumers in
the position of paying the difference. 9 ' Consumers who refused to
pay the differential were allegedly "diverted" by defendants to
those shops that agreed to charge the prevailing rate.9 2 Because
plaintiffs lost business, they asserted that defendants' conduct indirectly resulted in an unlawful boycott of plaintiffs' shops.9 3
94
Focusing on the goal of antitrust laws to foster competition, 9 5
the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The court reasoned that plaintiffs sought to "use the antitrust laws
as a shield" from competition.9 6 The court explained:
In trying to obtain the lowest prices defendants are doing no
more than conducting their business as any rational employer
would. An unlawful boycott will not result from a buyer's refusal
to pay a higher price for goods or services where it can buy them
See, e.g., Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 452-53 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the United States
Supreme Court has applied the rule of reason to a host of group boycott cases); LAwRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 229-30 (1977)
("There is more confusion about the scope and operation of their per se rule against
group boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of the per se doctrine.").
88 See Belmar v. Cipolla, 96 N.J. 199, 219, 475 A.2d 533, 544 (1984) (declaring that
New Jersey was not bound to follow federal law regarding application of per se rule).
89 168 N.J. Super. 68, 401 A.2d 722 (Law Div. 1979), affd, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423
A.2d 311 (App. Div. 1980).
90 Id. at 73, 401 A.2d at 724. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants conspired to fix
prices. Id.
91 Id. at 84, 401 A.2d at 730.
92 Id.
86

87

93

Id.

94

Id. at 88, 401 A.2d at 732.

95 Id.
96

Id.
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97

Group boycotts under the Act have also arisen in the real estate context. In

Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Ser-

a multiple listing service ("MLS") 99 admitted only members
who had belonged to a predecessor listing service.10 0 A real estate
broker who was not a member of the old listing service alleged,
among other things, that defendant's refusal to admit him as a
member constituted a restraint of trade. 1 ' The trial court, analyzing this dispute under the per se rule,10 2 concluded that defendant's membership requirements were illegal because they
constituted a "concerted refusal to deal" in the classic sense. 10 3 Fovice,

cusing on the "realities of the situation," the court discussed the
practical effects of denying plaintiff access to the MLS:
Reducing the instant issue to the realities of the situation we
find that plaintiff's success in obtaining listings or locating
properties for sale-his "stock in trade"-is governed and limited by his own efforts, contacts and abilities. He has only a limited supply of "shoes on the shelves." His commissions on
selling are limited by that supply, and if buyers come to him to
find out what he has to sell the same limitations apply. On the
other hand, the members of defendant corporation are not limited by their own efforts, contacts and abilities in the stock on
hand. Rather, by reason of their membership in the MLS each
such member broker has available to him not only the listings
which he himself has obtained but also those obtained by more
than 50 fellow members in the MLS and over 400 salespeople
10 4
associated with them.
97 Id. at 85, 401 A.2d at 730 . The court did not explicitly decide whether it was
analyzing the group boycott claim under the rule of reason or the per se rule. Id.
98 113 N.J. Super. 371, 273 A.2d 795 (Ch.Div. 1971).
99 An MLS is essentially a clearing house for residential real estate listings. Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 89 NJ. 306, 318, 446 A.2d 83, 89, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982).
100 Oates, 113 N.J. Super. at 378, 273 A.2d at 799. Though no proof was offered, the
court intimated that the exclusion may have been racially motivated because plaintiff
was "a Negro" and all members of the MLS were white. Id. at 374 & n.2, 273 A.2d at
796 & n.2.
101 Id. at 374, 273 A.2d at 796.
102 Id. at 382-89, 273 A.2d at 801-05. In light of the subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court of NewJersey in Pomanowski, see infra notes 105-14 and accompanying
text, which employed the rule of reason instead of the per se rule in judging MLS
issues, Oates is severely limited.
103 Id. at 382, 273 A.2d at 801.
104 Id. at 381-82, 273 A.2d at 800. In dicta, the court also stated that defendant's
membership requirements were unjustified under the rule of reason, rejecting defendant's claim that plaintiff's exclusion did not have a substantial impact on trade.
Id. at 389-94, 273 A.2d at 805-07.
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In Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Board of Realtors, decided
eleven years after Oates, the New Jersey Supreme Court reached a
very different conclusion about restrictions placed on access to an
MLS.1°5 There, the Monmouth County Board of Realtors@ made
an MLS available to its members." 6 A licensed real estate broker
was denied access to the MLS because he voluntarily resigned from
the Board of Realtors@. 0 7 The broker claimed that denying him
access to the MLS because he was not a Realtor® violated the
08

Act. 1

Applying the rule of reason, 10 9 the supreme court held that
the broker had not proven an antitrust violation.1 10 Initially, the
Court noted the procompetitive nature of an MLS:
The procompetitive virtues of a multiple listing service are obvious; it is an ingenious mechanism for reducing the market imperfections inherent in the real estate industry. It operates as a
clearing house of sorts in that the purchaser has access to a wide
selection of properties and the vendor-broker is exposed to a
larger market than could be reached through the unaided efforts of a single seller.'1 '
In light of those procompetitive benefits, the court identified the
relevant inquiry:
[Would] the anticompetitive effects of conditioning [Monmouth County MLS] access on Board membership [be] outweighed by the procompetitive gains that flow from Board
sponsorship of [the Monmouth County MLS]. If that competitive benefit would be lost, and if such loses would outweigh the
negative effect of the access 2rule, then the rule is an acceptable
11
limitation on competition.
After reviewing an extensive record, including submissions
from the Attorney General of New Jersey and the New Jersey Association of Realtors® as amici curiae, the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected the broker's claim that conditioning access to an MLS
upon Realtor® membership constituted an antitrust violation. 1 3
105 See Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 89 N.J, 306, 446 A.2d 83,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982). The court did not explicitly discuss group boycotts or

refusals to deal; however, the court's analysis was similar to the ones employed in such
cases.
106 Id. at 310, 446 A.2d at 85.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 310-11, 446 A.2d at 85.
109 Id. at 315, 446 A.2d at 87.
110 Id. at 324, 446 A.2d at 93.
H Id. at 318, 446 A.2d at 89.
112 Id. at 320-21, 446 A.2d at 90 (citation omitted).
113 Id. at 324, 446 A.2d at 92.
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The court explained:
[T]here has been no showing that the elimination of the access
rule will effect any pro-competitive benefits-that [Monmouth
County MLS] participation will be less expensive or even remain
the same, or that a greater number of brokers will thereby be
able to achieve access. Absent any showing of a true denial of
access, the defendants should not be required to dismantle or
significantly alter a trade association that provides procompetitive benefits in excess of any anticompetitive effects engendered.
Accordingly, we conclude that in conditioning [Monmouth
County MLS] access on [Monmouth County Board of Realtors@] membership, defendants have created a reasonable1 14restraint of trade-one not in violation of our Antitrust Act.
Pomanowski illustrates that an antitrust violation will not exist
absent proof that competition is harmed. The fact that an individual broker is damaged by the restraint, without proof that the industry itself and, ultimately, the consumer suffers, is insufficient.
The need to prove harm to competition applies equally to
medical group boycott claims. In Desai v. St. Barnabas Medical
Center," 5 a physician who was denied access to a hospital staff alleged that the hospital participated in an illegal group boycott
and/or refusal to deal.1 16 Noting that NewJersey courts had never
analyzed hospital staffing decisions under the Act, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the issue should be reviewed under the
rule of reason.1 17 While the court declined to decide whether all
hospital privilege cases should be governed by the rule of reason,118 the court recognized that plaintiff's failure to offer "any
proofs regarding market area or market power" was fatal to his
claim. "19 As a result, plaintiff's "allegations of lost patient referrals"-that is, injury to himself-was insufficient absent harm to
the public. 20
114 Id.; see also Venture Resources Group, Inc. v. Greater N.J. Regional, Civil Action
95-0401, slip op. at 10 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 1995) (denying a preliminary injunction to a
broker who claimed, among other things, that conditioning access to a multiple listing service upon membership in a local board of Realtors and compliance with ethical
standards violated the Act).
115 103 N.J. 79, 510 A.2d 662 (1986).
116 Id. at 84, 510 A.2d at 664.

Id. at 98, 510 A.2d at 672.
Id. at 98-99, 510 A.2d at 672.
119 Id. at 99, 510 A.2d at 672.
120 Id.; see also Petrocco v. Dover Gen. Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 273 N.J. Super. 501,
523-25, 642 A.2d 1016, 1027-29 (App. Div.) (citation omitted) (dismissing chiroprac117

118

tor's group boycott claim against hospital because plaintiff failed to prove the exist-

ence of a conspiracy), certif denied, 138 N.J. 264, 649 A.2d 1284 (1994).
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These cases demonstrate that New Jersey courts will not
mechanically evaluate group boycott/refusal to deal cases under
the per se label. Even in Oates, a case decided under the per se
rule, the court offered a lengthy analysis of defendant's conduct
under the rule of reason.1 2 1 Accordingly, as in any other rule of
reason case, parties raising group boycott/refusal to deal claims
must be prepared to demonstrate how the challenged practice adversely affects competition, not just themselves as competitors.
3.

Price Fixing

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "no antitrust offense is more pernicious than price fixing."1 22 In fact, preserving a free market system without price fixing is "essential to
economic freedom."

123

There are two general types of price fixing: horizontal and
vertical. Horizontal price fixing exists where "competitors at the
same market level agree to fix or control the prices they will charge
for their respective goods and services." 124 Vertical price fixing,
often characterized as resale price maintenance, exists where a
manufacturer requires the distributors of its product "'to observe
fixed resale prices."'

125

New Jersey courts have considered price fixing claims in Lawn
26
and Chick's Auto Body.12 7 In Lawn King, the franchisor "recommended" and "suggested" that Lawn King franchisees charge
King

121 Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., 113 N.J. Super. 371, 38994, 273 A.2d 795, 805-07 (Ch. Div. 1971).
122 F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 630 (1992).
123 Id. at 632.
124 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 670 (3d Cir. 1993). Of course, not all
agreements concerning price are illegal under the antitrust laws. Justice White has
explained:
Not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have
an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even
unreasonable restraints. Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, including price competition, but they are not per se illegal, and
many of them withstand attack under any existing antitrust standard.
Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually
unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on
price is necessary to market the product at all.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979).
125 State v. Lawn King, 84 N.J. 179, 201, 417 A.2d 1025, 1037 (1980) (quoting
United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920)).
126 See id. at 201-05, 417 A.2d at 1037-39. For other discussion of Lawn King, see
supra notes 80.84 and accompanying text, and infra notes 143-44 and accompanying
text.
127 See generally Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super.
68, 401 A.2d 722 (Law Div. 1979), affid, 176 N.J. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (App. Div. 1980).
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certain prices.1 28 In affirming the appellate division's reversal of
vertical price fixing convictions, the New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed that the state had failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the franchisees were coerced into accepting the
franchisor's price demands."
The New Jersey Supreme Court
also emphasized that "a determination that there was not illegal
coercive price fixing is particularly compelling in the franchising
situation where the franchisor and franchisee are in contractual
agreement to maintain quality control and a uniform image.""' °
The court also rejected claims that the franchisor participated
in horizontal price fixing by its franchisees.1 3 1 The court simply
found no evidence that the restraints were imposed or enforced
horizontally. 3 2 Moreover, the court recognized that, absent "persuasive evidence" of an independent agreement among horizontal
competitors, "retailers who adhere to suggested retail prices, knowing that compliance by competitors is expected by the manufacturer in consonance with its price maintenance policy, do not
thereby, without more, become co-conspirators with the
1 33
manufacturer."
Price fixing claims were also rejected in Chick's Auto Body v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.13 1 There, plaintiffs (auto
body shops) alleged that defendants (insurance companies) con1 35
spired to establish the labor rate for certain automobile repairs.
Relying on the absence of an agreement among defendants, and
the fact that insurance rates are common knowledge throughout
the industry, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the
price-fixing claims:
Plaintiffs do not point to any facts which indicate or suggest that
defendants had some agreement with respect to their dealing
with plaintiffs, or that they had conspired or acted in concert on
this subject. Apparently, plaintiffs only indicated that an inference in this regard may be drawn from the fact that defendants
For other discussion of Chick's Auto Body, see supra notes 89-97 and accompanying
text.
128 Lawn King, 84 N.J. at 202, 417 A.2d at 1037.
129 Id. at 203, 417 A.2d at 1038.

132

Id.
Id. at 207, 417 A.2d at 1040.
Id. at 207-08, 417 A.2d at 1040.

133

Id. at 207, 417 A.2d at 1040. The court identified this pricing conduct as "con-

130
131

scious parallelism." Id. For a brief summary of "conscious parallelism," see supra
notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
'34 Chick's Auto Body, 168 N.J. Super. at 85-87, 401 A.2d at 730-31.
135 Id. at 85, 401 A.2d at 730.
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have acted similarly - i.e., "conscious parallelism." But "conscious parallelism," without additional facts leading to an inference [of] concerted action, is not enough to satisfy the statutory
requirements and get the plaintiff past a motion for dismissal or
summary judgment. 136
Both Lawn King and Chick's Auto Body properly recognized the
doctrine of conscious parallelism and explicitly rejected the pricefixing claims in those cases because there was no proof of an agreement to fix prices. While these cases are older, the principles they
137
espouse remain valid.
4.

Vertical Non-Price Restrainys

Recent New Jersey cases have recognized that many vertical
non-price restraints are not per se illegal. In Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc.,' the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
explained the permissible boundaries of such restraints:
It is not per se illegal for a manufacturer or distributor of a product acting unilaterally or independently to exercise his discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal; to restrict its sales
to authorized dealers or franchisees; to grant exclusive dealerships in a particular territory, or to impose other nonprice restrictions. Nevertheless, whenever any such marketing decision
of a manufacturer, distributor or franchisor is not taken unilaterally or independently, but rather in concert with one or more
of its customers, dealers
or franchisees, the action constitutes a
13 9
horizontal restraint.
Applying these principles, the appellate division recognized
that a distributor's grant of an exclusive territory to a dealer and its
refusal to deal with plaintiff did not constitute a restraint of trade
under the per se rule. 4 The court emphasized that plaintiff had
offered no evidence of "any motive to eliminate price competition,
of a conspiracy between [defendants], or of a horizontal market
allocation."' 4 1 The court, without significant discussion, also concluded that plaintiff had not demonstrated that defendants' con42
duct was invalid under the rule of reason.1
Id. at 86-87, 401 A.2d at 736 (citation omitted).
See Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson, 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993) (discussing
conscious parallelism).
138 180 N.J. Super. 6, 433 A.2d 780 (App. Div. 1981).
139 Id. at 23, 433 A.2d at 789.
140 Id. at 23-25, 433 A.2d at 789-90.
141 Id. at 25, 433 A.2d at 790.
142 Id. at 26, 433 A.2d at 790; see also Finlay & Assoc., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 146
N.J. Super. 210, 226-30, 369 A.2d 541, 549-52 (Law Div. 1976) (footnotes and citations
136
137
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Similarly, in Lawn King, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that numerous vertical non-price restraints imposed upon a franchisee (such as exclusive territorial restrictions, mandatory cooperative advertising, and the franchisor's right of first refusal should
the franchisee decide to transfer the franchise) could not support
a criminal violation of the Act and, in any event, should be analyzed under the rule of reason.1 43 The court emphasized that the
restraints, and particularly the territorial restrictions, did not adversely affect interbrand competition:
There has been no demonstration in this case that the territorial
restrictions, albeit more restrictive than those in Sylvania, had a
"pernicious effect" on the interbrand competition or that they
lacked any "redeeming virtues." The State made no showing
that consumers were not free to choose among the various lawn
care service companies competing with Lawn King. Indeed,
there was trial testimony to the effect that several interbrand
competitors competed heavily in Lawn King dealership
territories.1 44
Two early New Jersey decisions invalidating vertical non-price
restraints without analyzing how those restraints harmed competition may no longer be valid. In Clairol, Inc. v. Cosmetics Plus,145 a
manufacturer of hair products sought injunctive relief to prevent a
distributor from selling the public certain products intended only
for "professional" use. 146 The distributor claimed that the manufacturer's attempt to impose limitations on its sales constituted a
per se illegal vertical restraint. 147 While the court ultimately
granted injunctive relief to the manufacturer on other grounds, it
concluded that the "vertical " 1restraints
imposed by the manufac48
turer on the buyer must fall.
Similarly, the court in Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 4 9
based its decision on the per se rule instead of the rule of reason.
The state alleged that certain vertical restraints imposed by a manufacturer upon distributors of cosmetics violated the Act. 150 Even
omitted), aff'd, 155 N.J. Super. 331, 382 A.2d 933 (App. Div.) (finding that manufacturer's termination of distributorship agreement did not violate Act because competition was not harmed), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 467, 391 A.2d 482 (1978).
143 State v. Lawn King, 84 N.J. 179, 194-98, 417 A.2d 1025, 1033-35 (1980).
144 Id. at 195, 417 A.2d at 1034.
145 130 NJ. Super. 81, 325 A.2d 505 (Ch. Div. 1974).
146 Id. at 83-87, 325 A.2d at 506.
147 Id. at 95, 325 A.2d at 512.
148 Id. at 101, 325 A.2d at 515.
149 120 NJ. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (Ch. Div. 1972).
150 Id. at 221-22, 293 A.2d at 684-85.
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though the defendant had only a one percent share of the market, t"' the court found that restraints restricting (1) the persons
from whom distributors could buy or sell defendant's products, (2)
the manner in which the distributors could advertise defendant's
product, and (3) the right of distributors to cooperate with other
distributors in a retail sales effort were per se violations of the
Act. 152
Both Kugler and Clairolwere decided before the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Sylvania limiting the application of
the per se rule concerning vertical non-price restraints. Today, in
light of Sylvania, the claimed antitrust violations in those cases
would be analyzed under the rule of reason.
5.

Price Discrimination

Though it exists in many forms, 5 ' price discrimination occurs
when "[a] business rival has priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to eliminate or retard competition and thereby
gain and exercise control over prices in the relevant market."' 5 4
law has no specific provision outUnlike federal law, 155 NewJersey
1 56
lawing price discrimination.
In Gregory Marketing Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp.,157 the New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, made clear that parties
are not permitted to assert price discrimination claims under the
Act.' 5 8 There, plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in price
Id. at 241, 293 A.2d at 695.
Id. at 248, 293 A.2d at 699.
Schmauder & Sheehan, supra note 2, at 20.
154 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2587 (1993).
155 Price discrimination (as contrasted to "predatory pricing" see discussion infra
notes 163-74 and accompanying text) is prohibited under federal law by the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). That Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce ... and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
Id.
156 Gregory Marketing Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 207 NJ. Super. 607, 613-14,
504 A.2d 828, 831-32 (Law Div. 1985).
157 207 N.J. Super. 607, 504 A.2d 828 (Law Div. 1985).
158 Id. at 610, 504 A.2d at 830.
151
152
153
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discrimination in violation of section 56:9-3 because defendant
Wakefern received preferential prices on apple juice products
purchased from defendant Red Cheek. 5 9 Relying on the absence
of a general price discrimination remedy under the Act or a specific remedy governing the sale of apple products, the court dismissed the claim. 6 Moreover, the court held that even though
the Act must be "construed in harmony" with the Sherman Act, its
federal counterpart, the Sherman Act did not regulate price discrimination-only the Robinson-Patman Act did. 16 1 Because the
New Jersey Legislature had never elected to adopt its own version
of the Robinson-Patman Act, the court concluded that it should
62
not recognize a general price discrimination cause of action.1
6.

Predatory Pricing

Like price discrimination, predatory pricing is characterized
by a competitor's scheme to drive its rivals out of business by pricing its products in an unfair manner. 63 The elements of predatory
pricing are: (1) proof that defendant had a rational economic motive, that is, evidence that defendant's losses caused by its pricing
could later be recouped through monopoly profits,"6 and (2) a
showing that the defendant's prices were set below "some appropri165
ate measure of CoSt."
In Ideal Daiy, the appellate division explained that "[t] he rationale underlying these requirements recognize that predatory
prices represent an investment in a future monopoly. If the market conditions are such that monopoly pricing is later impossible,
66
one can infer that prices are not predatory."
Consistent with its focus on monopoly concerns, the court
recognized that predatory pricing schemes are often pleaded
Id.
Id. at 614, 504 A.2d at 832 (citation omitted). The court noted that the New
Jersey Legislature had enacted specific price discrimination statutes for certain industries, but not for the one at issue in Greg0y Marketing. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:29A-4 (West 1994) (insurance rates); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-89 (West 1994) (alcoholic beverages); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-22 (West 1989) (motor fuel).
161 Id. at 615-16, 504 A.2d at 832-33.
162 See id. at 616, 504 A.2d at 833.
163 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2589 (1993).
164 Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 NJ. Super. 140, 19394, 659 A.2d 904, 930 (App. Div.) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-91 (1986)), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A.2d 1197 (1995).
165 Id. at 194, 659 A.2d at 930.
159
160

166 Id.
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under § 2 of the Sherman Act. 167 However, the court "assume [d]
that a conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing may also be actionable under section 56:9-3 as a conspiracy in restraint of
trade." 168 Thus, Ideal did not lose its cause Of action because it did
not allege that defendants had violated section 56:9-4 of the Act,
the corollary to § 2 of the Sherman Act.169
Ultimately, however, Ideal's predatory pricing claims failed because it did not offer any evidence that defendant, a milk processor, could have later recouped its losses incurred in a milk pricing
war with Ideal "by raising prices to noncompetitive monopolistic
levels in the future."'7 0 Rejecting Ideal's claims that such proof was
"obvious," the court reasoned that market conditions in the milk
industry, including "keen" competition among dairies and federal
and state regulation, rendered it "particularly improbable" that defendant could achieve monopoly power.' 7 '
Lastly, the court emphasized that low prices alone do not suggest predatory pricing.' 72 Instead, the court recognized that aggressive pricing strategies may benefit consumers by stimulating
competition.'
The fact that Ideal was harmed by such pricing
17 4
was, the court held, "irrelevant" under the Act.
IV.

MONOPOLIZATION

Section 56:9-4(a) "I of the Act makes it "unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or to combine or
conspire" to monopolize trade "in any relevant market" in New
Jersey.' 7 6 As is the case under the federal antitrust laws,' 77 monopoly offenses 178 are governed by different rules from those applicable to restraint of trade claims.' 79 Perhaps the most significant
167 Id. at 193, 659 A.2d at 929.
168 Id.
169 See id.

170 Id. at 197, 659 A.2d at 931.
171
172
173
174

Id., 659 A.2d at 932.
Id. at 198, 204-05, 659 A.2d at 935.
Id. at 198, 205, 659 A.2d at 932, 935.
Id. at 176, 659 A.2d at 921.

175 The remaining subsections of § 56:9-4 deal with the monopoly implications of a
corporation acquiring stock of one or more other corporations so as to "substantially
lessen competition." No reported cases have cited or discussed those provisions.
176 N.J. STAT. ANN. §

56:9-4(a) (West 1989).

177 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1 (restraint of trade) with 15 U.S.C. § 2 (concerning monopolization and attempt to monopolize).
178 The terms "monopoly offenses" or "monopoly claims" will be used in this section to encompass both monopolization and attempt to monopolize causes of action.
179 The same conduct, however, may be the subject of both restraint of trade and
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difference between claims of monopoly and those alleging restraint
of trade is that a single defendant may be guilty of monopoly offenses while restraint of trade claims require a "contract, combination or conspiracy.""' ° The United States Supreme Court has
stated the elements of monopoly offenses as: (1) predatory or anticompetitive conduct; (2) a specific intent to monopolize; and (3)
a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power in the relevant market. 18 1 The reported NewJersey monopoly cases have generally followed these substantive principles of federal monopoly
law.

18 2

For example, in Exxon Corp. v. Wagner,18 3 the appellate division
affirmed a summary judgment dismissing claims of monopolization
and attempt to monopolize, noting the absence of any intent to
monopolize and the lack of proof that Exxon had a "dangerous
probability" of obtaining monopoly power over the sale of the relevant products in the relevant geographic market.18 4 In a more recent case, Van Natta Mechanical Corp. v. DiStaulo,'8 5 the appellate
division also relied upon the federal criteria,1 8 6 though the court
subsequently dismissed the antitrust claims due to lack of antitrust
standing. 18 7 Thus, as in many other areas of substantive antitrust
monopoly claims. State v. Scioscia, 200 N.J. Super. 28, 40, 490 A.2d 327, 334 (App.
Div.), certif denied, 101 NJ. 277, 501 A.2d 942 (1985).
180 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-3 (West 1989) (making unlawful every "contract,
combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade") with NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-4(a)
(making it unlawful for "any person" to commit a monopoly offense). As to the requirement that restraints of trade involve more than one offender, see supranotes 2430 and accompanying text.
Section 56:9-4(a) expressly provides a cause of action for conspiracy to monopolize but does not provide for a claim for conspiracy to attempt to monopolize. Federal law similarly precludes any such cause of action. *See, e.g., Windy City Circulating
Co. v. Charles Levy Circulating Co., 550 F. Supp. 960, 967 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Alabama v.
Blue Bird Body Co., 71 F.R.D. 606, 609 (M.D. Ala. 1976), modified, 573 F.2d 309 (5th
Cir. 1978); PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw,
839 at 359
(1978).
181 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993). For a discussion of the concept of relevant market, see supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
182 Reported federal cases in which monopoly claims under the Act were asserted
along with causes of action under federal antitrust laws do not even discuss the New
Jersey claims separately. See, e.g., Regency Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
723 F. Supp. 250, 270 (D.N.J. 1989); Michael Halebian N.J., Inc. v. Roppe Rubber
Corp., 718 F. Supp. 348, 355, 359 (D.N.J. 1989).
183 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
184 Exxon Corp. v. Wagner, 154 N.J. Super. 538, 548-49, 382 A.2d 45, 50 (App. Div.
1977).
185 277 N.J. Super. 175, 649 A.2d 399 (App. Div. 1994).
186 Id. at 188-89, 649 A.2d at 406-07.
187 Id. at 190, 649 A.2d at 407. For a discussion of antitrust standing, see infra notes
305-24 and accompanying text.
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law, there is no substantial difference between the standards of the
Act and those of the comparable federal statute in the area of monopoly offenses. 8
V.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Though section 56:9-18 requires that the Act "be construed in
harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal
antitrust statutes," this requirement applies only to substantive
law.189 That was the conclusion of the appellate division in Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc. 9 ' In that case, the
court held that although a jury trial was guaranteed under the federal Sherman Act, New Jersey's particular criteria for analyzing
whether statutes create jury trial rights led to the opposite conclusion. 19 ' The court rejected the defendants' assertion that section
56:9-18 of the Act dictated the same result as did federal law, observing that jury trial rights are procedural ones that are determined by the internal law of the forum. 2
As a result of Boardwalk Properties,procedural rulings under the
Act need not follow federal law. Many such rulings, however, have
conformed with federal practice, in recognition of the superior experience of federal courts with antitrust claims.

188 Other cases in which monopoly offenses were alleged and were addressed based
on more brief discussions of federal law include Desai v. St. Barnabas Medical Ctr.,
103 NJ. 79, 97, 510 A.2d 662, 671 (1986); G&W, Inc. v. Borough of East Rutherford,
280 NJ. Super. 507, 513-14, 656 A.2d 11, 14 (App. Div. 1995); Monmouth Real Estate
Inv. Trust v. Manville Foodland, Inc., 196 NJ. Super. 262, 271, 482 A.2d 186, 190-91
(App. Div. 1984), certif denied, 99 N.J. 234, 491 A.2d 722 (1985); Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., Superior Court of NewJersey, Chancery Division,
Atlantic County, Docket No. ATL-C-000052-89E, slip op. at 24-27, 61-67 (March 25,
1993); Finlay & Assoc., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 146 NJ. Super. 210, 222-24, 369
A.2d 541, 547-49 (Law Div. 1976), affd, 155 N.J. Super. 331, 382 A.2d 933 (App. Div.),
certif denied, 77 N.J. 467, 391 A.2d 482 (1978); Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
120 N.J. Super. 216, 248-50, 293 A.2d 682, 699-701 (Ch. Div. 1972). Except for G &
W, in which summaryjudgment against the antitrust plaintiff was reversed, all of these
cases rejected the monopoly claims asserted.
189 For a detailed discussion of the effect of § 56:9-18 on substantive issues, see
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
190 See Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., 253 N.J. Super. 515,
602 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1991).
191 Id. at 529-30, 602 A.2d at 740-41. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see
generally Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, The Right to a CivilJuy Trial in New
Jersey, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1461 (1995).
192 Boardwalk Properties,253 N.J. Super. at 529, 602 A.2d at 740 (quoting Ettelson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943)).

664
A.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:637

Jurisdiction

Both the United States Supreme Court and New Jersey state
courts agree that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims.1 9 3 State antitrust claims, however, can be cognizable in either state or federal court.1 94 If the facts support both
a federal and a state antitrust claim, a party is free to confine its
case to its cause of action under the Act and proceed in state
court,' 95 or assert only the federal claim (or both claims) in federal
court. 196

B. Jury Trial Rights
As described above, the Act has been held not to create a right
to a jury trial. ' 97 Thus, where a claim under the Act is the sole
cause of action, the case will not be triable to a jury if the case is
brought in state court. Where a claim under the Act does not
stand alone, however, the right to ajury trial in state court may vary
depending on the overall nature of the action.' 98 Thus, in cases
otherwise primarily equitable in nature, and therefore not triable
to ajury under NewJersey's doctrine of ancillary equitable jurisdic20 0
tion, 19 9 a claim under the Act will not be triable to a jury either.
However, where the overall case is primarily legal, the antitrust
claim will ordinarily be tried to a jury with the rest of the case unless it is completely independent of the equitable claims.2 0 ' Plain193 See, e.g., Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S.
436, 440 (1920); Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc., 180 N.J. Super. 6, 20, 433 A.2d
780, 787 (App. Div. 1981).
194 In addition to the general jurisdiction of the NewJersey courts to enforce rights
under NewJersey statutes, state court power to grant injunctive relief is expressly conferred by sections 56:9-10(a) and (b). Federal jurisdiction may be obtained if there is
diversity of citizenship 6r, if the presence of other federal claims permit a claim under
the Act to be encompassed in the same action, under the doctrines of pendent or
ancillary jurisdiction. For a discussion of those latter doctrines, now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1367, see David D. Siegel, Changes in FederalJurisdictionand Practice Under the
New (Dec. 1, 1990)JudicialImprovements Act, 133 F.RD. 61, 65 (1991).
195 Glasofer Motors, 180 N.J. Super. at 21, 433 A.2d at 788.
196 See supra note 191.
197 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 N.J. 333, 343, 587 A.2d 615, 620 (1991) (holding that the right to jury trial attaches in legal but not equitable actions, and determination of whether case is primarily legal or equitable turns on historical basis for
cause of action and requested relief).
199 For a discussion of this doctrine, see generally Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra
note 191, at 1472-85.
200 Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., 253 N.J. Super. 515, 602
A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1991).
201 See New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Renner, 18 NJ. 484, 493, 114 A.2d 555, 559
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tiffs under the Act who desire a jury trial can ensure that they get
one if they are able to bring their cases in federal court, because
the federal system will provide a jury trial on demand in such
cases.

C.

20 2

Summary Judgment

Two cases from the appellate division have apparently adopted
contrary views of the standards for summary judgment in cases arising under the Act.20 3 Because summary judgment standards in
general were until very recently evolving differently in the federal
and New Jersey systems, there was room to argue that certain elements of the federal approach were not appropriate under the Act.
In Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., °4 the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the state in its civil antitrust
action. On appeal, one of the defendants argued that "summary
judgment should be used sparingly in antitrust cases, relying on
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System." 20 5 Poller had indeed
cautioned:
Summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and
hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses
are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised.
Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury20which
so long
6
has been the hallmark of "even handed justice."
Kimmelman, however, rejected the hostile attitude toward summary judgment reflected in Poller, noting that the "concept does
(1955) (permitting a purely legal counterclaim to be tried to a jury though the complaint presented solely equitable, and therefore nonjury, issues). The Renner court so
ruled because the issues of the counterclaim were considered so independent of the
complaint as to stand on their own. Presumably, if an antitrust claim could be shown
to be equally independent of the legal claims in a primarily legal action, the same
principle would result in a denial of a jury trial on the antitrust claim despite the
overall nature of the action.
202 See generally Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 191, at 1487-88.
203 Compare Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 508, 506 A.2d
381 (App. Div. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 108 N.J. 123, 527 A.2d 1368 (1987) with G
& W, Inc. v. Borough of East Rutherford, 280 N.J. Super. 507, 656 A.2d 11 (App. Div.
1995). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 203-18 and accompanying text.
204 208 N.J. Super. 508, 506 A.2d 381 (App. Div. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 108
N.J. 123, 527 A.2d 1368 (1987).
205 Id. at 519, 506 A.2d at 387 (citing Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S.
464 (1962)).
206 368 U.S. at 473 (footnote omitted).
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not appear as prevalent a rule in more recent cases as in former
years. ' 207 The absence of issues of motive and intent, and the uncontradicted evidence of a bid rigging conspiracy, satisfied the
20 8
court that summary judgment was properly granted.
Kimmelman, decided on March 11, 1986, foreshadowed the decision of the United States Supreme Court only fifteen days later in
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 20 9 There, in a
predatory pricing case, the Court adopted a far more generous attitude toward summary judgment in antitrust cases, though without
specifically addressing Poller. The Court held that "conduct that is
as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of conspiracy." 21 0 The Court required evidence "that tends to exclude the
possibility"2 1 1 that the conduct complained of was undertaken for
valid competitive reasons. 12 When read together with two other
1986 decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,2 3 and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,2 14 which generally lib207 Kimmelman, 208 N.J. Super. at 519, 506 A.2d at 387 (citing Weit v. Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 464 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
988 (1982); Aladdin Oil v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1979)). The
court might also have noted the Supreme Court's own decisions in First Nat'l Bank v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968), and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984), both of which (contrary to Poller) upheld summary judgment, and
emphasized its appropriateness in antitrust cases.
208 Kimmelman, 208 N.J. Super. at 520, 506 A.2d at 388.
209 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
210 Id. at 597 n.21 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64).
211 Id. at 597.
212 Id. at 597-98 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). The Court went on to state that
allegations of a conspiracy that was economically senseless would not defeat summary
judgment. See id. at 588, 590, 593, 595, 597. In its most recent decision, the Court
made clear that:
The Court's requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs' claims make
economic sense did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing
summary judgment in antitrust cases. The Court did not hold that if
the moving party enunciates any economic theory supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual market, it is entifled to summary judgment. Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a
requirement that was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision. If the plaintiff's theory is economically senseless, no reasonable
jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1992) (footnote omitted).
213 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding that a party moving for summary judgment need
not support that motion with affidavits if other materials in the record demonstrate
that opponent of motion, who has ultimate burden of proof, cannot establish an essential element of claim or defense).
214 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (holding that if proofs offered by opponent of summary
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eralized the availability of summary judgment under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure," 5 Matsushita seemed to confirm the view
of Kimmelman that the Poller reticence to grant summary judgment
21 6
had been left behind.
A more recent decision of the appellate division, however,
seems to have revived Poller in New Jersey. In G & W, Inc. v. Borough of East Rutherford, 17 the court reversed a grant of summary
judgment against an antitrust plaintiff and remanded the matter
for trial. Though the evidence presented in opposition to the motion was ample, 2 18 so that summary judgment plainly was inappropriate even under the Pollerview, the court stated that "Is] ummary
judgment in antitrust cases is not favored," and quoted Polles hostile view of summary judgment in such cases. 19 Parties thus might
judgment motion would not satisfy burden applicable at trial, such as "clear and convincing evidence" in a defamation case like Anderson, summaryjudgment is appropriate even if some evidence in opposition to motion is presented). Until late 1995, New
Jersey had not followed this rule of Anderson. See infra notes 223-33 and accompanying
text. Celotex and Anderson were both decided on June 25, 1986.
215 Apart from the favorable substantive rules announced in Celotex and Anderson,
the cases are more noteworthy for their generally hospitable attitude toward summary
judgment. For example, Celotex declared that summary judgment is "not a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which
are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."' Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quotation omitted).
216 Even some cases after FirstNational Bank v. Cities Services, but before Matsushita,
declared that Poller had been superseded. E.g., Savage v. Waste Management, Inc.,
623 F. Supp. 1505, 1507 (D.S.C. 1985) (finding Poller "of questionable validity");
Ralph C. Wilson Indus., Inc. v. ABC, 598 F. Supp. 694, 699 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 794
F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986). Although Anderson involved libel rather than antitrust
claims, Anderson itself criticized the notion that Poller permitted-a case to go to a jury
without any "concrete evidence" that would support ajury verdict, merely because the
jury might disbelieve a defendant's denial of a conspiracy. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
217 280 N.J. Super. 507, 656 A.2d 11 (App. Div. 1995).
218 The evidence included the fact that although the plaintiff had sought a share of
the towing business in East Rutherford for 10 years, the defendant competitor,
Roadmasters, which made political contributions to public officials, and whose president was an "old and good friend" of the police chief (an influential figure in deciding who gets towing business), got municipal towing business without even paying for
a towing license. Id. at 511, 656 A.2d at 13. Moreover, Roadmasters used municipal
land for its towing business without paying any rent. Id. Finally, the Attorney General
had advised the municipality in 1986 that its towing arrangements violated the antitrust laws, and followed that with a 1989 formal opinion that a municipality using
private towing services must publicly advertise and bid the towing work. Id. at 511-12,
656 A.2d at 13. Despite that pointed advice, East Rutherford continued to maintain
exclusive towing relationships with the defendant towing companies. Id.
219 Id. at 514, 656 A.2d at 14 (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368
U.S. 464, 473 (1962)). Ironically, the court also cited Kimmelman, though it stands for
a diametrically opposite view of summaryjudgment than that expressed in G & W See
supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
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now argue that Poller remains the attitude of New Jersey courts toward summary judgment motions in cases under the Act.
Summary judgment standards are procedural rules, so that
New Jersey courts are free to differ with their federal counterparts
on the issue. However, the current federal attitude of greater hospitality to summary judgment is the right one. Poller resulted in a
virtual bar to summary judgment in antitrust cases even where a
case was patently meritless. The mere invocation of the antitrust
laws was often enough to force a trial.2 2 Especially given the huge
increase in antitrust cases (often motivated by the availability of
treble damages and attorneys' fees), 22 1 and the effect of even unsupported allegations on pro-competitive conduct, 222 there is no
reason to read summary judgment out of the panoply of available
procedures in antitrust cases. 2 23 Instead, Pollershould be viewed as
doing nothing more than stating the unexceptionable rule, applicable in all contexts, that courts should be cautious in granting
summary judgment where motive and intent are at issue.2 2 4
220 See, e.g., White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting Mutual Fund Inv.v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1977)) (condemning the use of Polleras a "magic wand waved indiscriminately by those opposing
summary judgment motions in antitrust actions"). As discussed supra note 213, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Anderson found it necessary to observe that a
party could not use Poller to defeat summary judgment, in the absence of concrete
evidence in its favor, merely because of the possibility that a jury might disbelieve a
defendant's sworn denial of any conspiracy.
221 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-10(b) (West 1989); 56:9-12(a) (West 1989); 15 U.S.C.
§ 12 (1994); see Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1978)
(noting the extraordinary temptation to sue created by the availability of treble damages and attorneys' fees), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
222 See Capital Imaging Assoc. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assoc., 996 F.2d 537, 541
(2d Cir. 1993); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 641 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 822 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (noting that mistaken
inferences in antitrust cases can chill the very conduct that antitrust law is designed to
protect).
223 Even Poller did not purport to do that. The statement from Poller quoted supra
in text accompanying note 205 applied only to "complex antitrust litigation where
motive and intent play leading roles." Poller,368 U.S. at 473. On issues not involving
motive or intent, Pollerdid not preclude summary judgment, as it might have had the
Court inserted a comma between "litigation" and "where," thus arguably changing the
meaning of its ruling to one that applied to all "complex antitrust litigation." The
Court's willingness to uphold summaryjudgment in Cities Service and Monsanto makes
this clear.
224 This position was apparently adopted in Exxon Corp. v. Wagner, 154 NJ. Super.
538, 541, 382 A.2d 533, 546 (App. Div. 1977), where the court noted that "where
subjective elements, such as intent or motive, are involved, summary judgment is to be
granted with caution." Because no such issues were involved there, the court was not
deterred from granting summaryjudgment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
concurred. See City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274
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Ironically, until late 1995, the substantive federal summary
judgment rule of Matsushita would not have been applied to the
Act. That departure was due to the fact that New Jersey had diverged from the federal system in evaluating summary judgment
motions on causes of action that involve burdens of proof different
from the normal "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the Supreme Court of the
United States announced that, in considering summary judgment
motions, a court should take into account the ultimate burden of
proof at trial and should grant the motion if its opponent has not
adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy that burden.2 2 5 Thus, Anderson would permit a court to grant the motion if, for example, a
"clear and convincing" standard would apply at trial, and the evidence offered in opposition to the motion does not rise to that
level. That holding is very much the lineal descendant of the ruling in Matsushita three months earlier, as both appear to entail the
weighing of evidence at the summary judgment stage.2 2 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey at first declined to adopt
n.5 (8th Cir. 1988). The idea, in any type of case, that summary judgment should be
granted only with caution where motive or intent are at issue is fundamental in New
Jersey in all courts. See, e.g., Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d
24 (1954).
Some federal cases, especially in the Ninth Circuit, continue to cite Pollerfor the
idea that summary judgment in antitrust cases is disfavored, see, e.g., High Technology
Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993) and Movie 1 & 2
v. United Artists Communications, 908 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1990). Many
more, however, now rely only on the statement of the "motive or intent" idea of Poller,
and characterize the "disfavored" language as dictum that does not create a heightened standard for summary judgment in antitrust cases, especially where motive and
intent are not at issue. See, e.g., Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d
682, 685 (8th Cir. 1993); Capital Imaging Assoc. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assoc.,
Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1993); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d Cir. 1992); Oksanen v. Page Mem. Hosp., 945 F.2d 696,
708 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992); Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Medina, 834 F.2d 242, 247 (1st Cir. 1987); Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d
1107, 1110-12 (5th Cir. 1979); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 1163,
1166-67 (7th Cir. 1978); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Giles Mem. Hosp., 846
F. Supp. 488, 492 (W.D. Va. 1994). Because Poller has not been expressly overruled,
that would seem to be a sound way of rationalizing that case with succeeding cases
that encourage or grant summary judgment in the antitrust context.
225 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-57 (1986).
226 Justice Brennan was the only justice to dissent in both Anderson and Matsushita.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Anderson equated the two cases, and criticized both for
endorsing an evidence-weighing process on summary judgment. See id. at 261 n.2
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Coincidentally, the very first case cited in the legal discussion in Anderson was Cities Service, an antitrust case in which the Court upheld summary judgment despite Poller. See id. at 248-49.
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the Anderson rule. In Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel PublishingCo., 2 2 7 a
defamation action in which a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof would apply at trial, the court considered and rejected Anderson as the governing rule for New Jersey summary judgment practice.228 The court concluded "that the clear-and-convincing test
inevitably implicates a weighing of the evidence that intrudes into
the province of the jury." 229 Thus, to the extent that any element
of a claim or defense under the Act must be proven by any standard other than the normal preponderance of the evidence, the
New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to have foreclosed reliance
on the federal Anderson rule.
On October 24, 1995, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
changed all that when it decided Brill v. The GuardianLife Insurance
Company of America." ° The court reviewed the entire landscape of
summary judgment, including the New Jersey cases and the trio of
23 1
1986 federal rulings that included Matsushita.
Ultimately, the
court adopted the federal summaryjudgment standard announced
in the 1986 trilogy, noting that many other states had already done
so 2 3 2 and that the court's Civil Practice Committee had recommended adopting that standard in New Jersey.2 33
After Brill, the substantive summary judgment standard applicable to the Act is now the same one (friendly to summary judgment) employed in federal antitrust cases. The more hospitable
federal attitude toward summary judgment in antitrust cases should
23 4
also be applied under the Act.
D.

"Exemptions"
Section 56:9-5, entitled "Exempt organizations and activities,"

227 104 N.J. 125,
228 Id. at 155-57,
229 Id. at 156-57,

516 A.2d 220 (1986).
516 A.2d at 235-36.
516 A.2d at 236. The fourJustices who dissented in Anderson had
expressed this same concern. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
230 142 N.J. 520, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).
231 Id. at 528-34, 666 A.2d at 150-53.
232 Id. at 538-40, 666 A.2d at 155-56.
233 Id. at 538, 666 A.2d at 155. In discussing its departure from Dairy Stores, which
had expressly rejected the Celotex/Anderson standard, see supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text, the court noted that Dairy Stores had "involved actual malice as a common-law bar to the defense of fair comment, while [Anderson] involved actual malice
as a constitutionally mandated component of a defamation action brought by a public
official or public person." Id. at 534, 666 A.2d at 153. The court then observed that,
eight years later, in Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 643 A.2d 1012
(1994), in which the plaintiff had been a public figure, the court had recited and
applied a version of the Anderson test, while "[o]ffering no comment or criticism." Id.
234 See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
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contains a series of limitations on the scope of the Act. Contrary to

its title, however, that section does not create any "exempt organizations." Rather, all three subsections of section 56:9-5 are
couched in terms of the limited activities that the Act does not forbid or penalize, so that even organizations mentioned in section
56:9-5 may be subject to liability based on conduct that violates the
Act. The cases under the Act have long made this principle
clear.23 5
Though section 56:9-5 is divided into three subsections, it protects two broad types of conduct. The first is the legitimate activity
of organizations that are apparently deemed by the Act to be reasonable "combinations." These include trade and professional organizations, 236 labor organizations, 23 7 agricultural or horticultural
cooperative organizations,2 3 8 and nonprofit religious or charitable
organizations. 239 The second set of exemptions relates to "activity
directed, authorized or permitted by any law of this State that is in
conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of this act," as well as
certain activities in specific regulated industries.2" This second
category appears to represent a "state action doctrine" under the
Act that somewhat parallels the federal doctrine of that same
235 See, e.g., State v. Scioscia, 200 N.J. Super. 28, 35-41, 490 A.2d 327, 331-34 (App.
Div.) (rejecting the contention that § 56:9-5(b) (3) exempted all activities of a public
utility from the Act), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 277, 501 A.2d 942 (1985); Pomanowski v.
Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 152 N.J. Super. 100, 107 n.2, 377 A.2d 791, 795
n.2 (Ch. Div. 1977), affd on this point and rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 166 N.J.
Super. 269, 272, 399 A.2d 990, 991 (App. Div. 1979) (finding that the § 56:9-5(a)
declaration that trade association activities are not per se illegal would not insulate
the defendant board if activities violative of Act were shown), certif denied, 81 N.J. 260,
405 A.2d 805 (1979); Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., 113 N.J.
Super. 371, 394, 273 A.2d 795, 807 (Ch. Div. 1971) (same).
236 These organizations are protected in two different subsections. Section 56:95(a) provides that such associations are not forbidden by or per se illegal under the
Act, and that the Act does not prohibit them "from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof not otherwise in violation of this act." For a brief discussion of
the history of that provision, see Perrucci & Mussomeli, supra note 2, at 165. Section
56:9-5(b) (9), which is limited to not-for-profit professional associations that are "licensed and regulated by the courts or any other agency of this State," permits them to
"recommend[ ] schedules of suggested fees, rates or commissions for use solely as
guidelines in determining charges for professional and technical services."
237 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b) (1) (West 1989).
238 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b) (2) (West 1989).
239 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b)(5) (West 1989).
240 These include public utilities, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b) (3) (West 1989); insurance, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b)(4) (West 1989); securities, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:95(b) (6) (West 1989); banks and savings and loans, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-5(b) (7),
(8) (West 1989); and those subject to the statutes involving sales of cigarettes and
motor fuels, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b) (10) (West 1989).
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name. 24 1 Its primary objective is to "prevent business entities from
being subjected to conflicting sets of governmental regulations." 2 4 2
The exemptions for organizational activities have been employed in only one published case to date.2 4 3 In Borland v. Bayonne
Hospital,2 " the charitable organization exemption was invoked in
favor of a number of defendant hospitals who were allegedly involved in a conspiracy to charge higher prices to members of the
union represented by the plaintiffs than to other patients. 24 5 The
court stated that " [ p] laintiffs' brief offers no reason or authority to
support its bare statement that defendant hospitals should be denied the exemption for which the statute specifically provides."2 4
241 Under the federal antitrust laws, the state action doctrine exempts restraints
that are "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" and "actively
supervised by the State itself." See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). New Jersey cases have applied this state
action doctrine in several cases where restraints created by the state were asserted to
have violated the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 135 N.J. 582, 59497, 641 A.2d 541, 547-49 (1994) (applying doctrine to municipal ban on vending in
Special Improvement District); Bally Mfg. Corp. v. N.J. Casino Control Comm'n, 85
N.J. 325, 336-37, 426 A.2d 1000, 1005-06 (applying doctrine to regulation prohibiting
casino from acquiring more than 50% of its slot machines from one manufacturer),
appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804 (1981); New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v.
Long, 75 N.J. 544, 565-66, 384 A.2d 795, 805-06 (1978) (applying doctrine to regulation establishing price guidelines for dispensers of hearing aids); see also Joseph H.
Reinfeld, Inc. v. Schieffelin & Co., 94 N.J. 400, 416-18, 466 A.2d 563, 571-72 (1983)
(discussing carefully and comprehensively the state action doctrine, though finding it
unnecessary to rely on the doctrine). Section 56:9-5(c) appears more simple, because
it applies to "any activity directed, authorized or permitted by any [State] law," without incorporating the notion of "active supervision." The specific provisions of certain portions of § 56:9-5(b), see supra note 239, in contrast, seem to rely entirely on the
idea that conduct is protected to the extent that it is "actively supervised" by a regulatory agency, even though the phrase "active supervision" is not used in the statute.
242 State v. Scioscia, 200 N.J. Super. 28, 39, 490 A.2d 327, 333 (App. Div.), certif
denied, 101 N.J. 277, 501 A.2d 942 (1985). Other cases making this same point include
Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 68, 75, 401 A.2d
722, 725 (Law Div. 1979), affd, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (App. Div. 1980)
and Borland v. Bayonne Hosp., 122 N.J. Super. 387, 406, 300 A.2d 584, 594 (Ch. Div.
1973), affd, 136 NJ. Super. 60, 344 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1975), affd, 72 N.J. 152, 369
A.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977).
243 In New Jersey Guild, the Supreme Court of New Jersey relied on § 56:9-5(b) (9),
which insulates price guidelines promulgated by professional associations. New Jersey
Guild, 75 N.J. at 564, 384 A.2d at 805. However, New Jersey Guild involved a price
guideline issued by a state administrative agency, not a private professional organization. Thus, while the cited section provided a useful analogy, it cannot be considered
to have disposed, by its terms, of the issue in New Jersey Guild
244 122 N.J. Super. 387, 300 A.2d 584 (Ch. Div. 1973), affid, 136 N.J. Super. 60, 344
A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 72 N.J. 152, 369 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817
(1977).
245 Id. at 405, 300 A.2d at 593.
246 Id. Cases since Borland, all of which centered on claims of wrongful denial of
hospital staff privileges, have declined to rely on that section, and have instead ad-
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In contrast, there have been a number of decisions under the
"state action doctrine" protections of sections 56:9-5(b) and (c) of
the Act. For example, the general protection of section 56:9-5(c)
has been applied in three cases by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. 4 7 In NewJersey Guild of HearingAid Dispensers v. Long,248 the
court faced a challenge to an administrative regulation that created
price guidelines for hearing aid dispensers. The plaintiff, Guild,
asserted that the guidelines in fact constituted a price ceiling. The
court held that the regulation was indeed merely a guideline, and
that such guides were specifically protected by section 56:95(b) (9).249 However, the court went on to note that "even if the
guideline constituted a price restriction in restraint of trade, the
Guild's argument must fail, as the express terms of the Antitrust
Act itself indicate its inapplicability to any anticompetitive action
authorized by state law."25 °
Three years later, the court decided Bally Manufacturing Corp.
v. New Jersey Casino Control Commission.15' There, the Casino Control Commission had adopted a regulation precluding any casino
from purchasing more than fifty percent of its slot machines from
a single manufacturer. Bally, the dominant manufacturer of slot
machines for use in NewJersey, asserted (among other things) that
the regulation violated the Act. The court disagreed, holding that
the regulation was authorized and permitted by the Casino Control
Act. 252 Because the regulation was permitted by that statute, the
court invoked section 56:9-5(c) and rejected Bally's Antitrust Act
dressed and rejected the antitrust claims on their merits. See Desai v. St. Barnabas
Medical Ctr., 103 N.J. 79, 99 n.9, 510 A.2d 662, 679 n.9 (1986); Belmar v. Cipolla, 96
NJ. 199, 219, 475 A.2d 533, 544 (1984); Petrocco v. Dover Gen. Hosp. & Medical Ctr.,
denied, 138 N.J. 264,
273 N.J. Super. 501, 524, 642 A.2d 1016, 1028 (App. Div.), certif[
649 A.2d 1284 (1994). The Petroccocourt found it "unclear" whether "charitable activities" encompasses decisions on staff privileges. See Petrocco, 273 NJ. Super. at 524, 642
A.2d at 1028.
247 In addition to those cases, which are discussed infra notes 247-255 and accompanying text, the court addressed the state action exemption in dictum in Monmouth
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. 102 N.J. 485, 509 A.2d 161 (1986). There, in
discussing the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, the court noted that although the statute
might have the effect of limiting the number of automobile dealers in New Jersey,
thus diminishing intrabrand competition, "[u]nquestionably, the state-action exemption would apply" to that statute even if it created an unreasonable restraint on competition. Id. at 494, 509 A.2d at 165.
248 75 N.J. 544, 384 A.2d 795 (1978).
249 Id. at 564, 384 A.2d at 805.
250 Id. (citing N.J.S.A. § 56:9-5(c)).
251 85 N.J. 325, 426 A.2d 1000 (1981).
252 N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:12-1 et seq. (West 1994). See Bally, 85 NJ. at 330-31, 426 A.2d at
1003.
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challenge.2 5 3
Most recently, in Fanelli v. City of Trenton,2 5 4 the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected a state antitrust challenge to a municipal
ordinance that restricted vending in Trenton's Special Improvement District ("SID"). After holding that New Jersey SID statutes
authorized the ordinance,2 5 5 the court again applied section
56:925 6
5 (c) to defeat the plaintiff's argument under the Act.
Timber Properties, Inc. v. Chester Township,25 7 the only lower
court case to invoke section 56:9-5 (c), is also the case that contains
the most analysis of that section. In Timber, plaintiff, a real estate
developer, challenged municipal zoning ordinance amendments
that compelled the denial of the developer's application to build
on its property. Among other things, plaintiff alleged that the
amendments violated the Act. The court held that there was "no
meaningful distinction in the application of exemption from antitrust liability provided by section 56:9-5(c) between a zoning ordinance and a state administrative regulation."2 58
Because the
Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL") authorizes municipalities to
adopt zoning ordinances, the court found that the amendments in
question were protected by the "authorized or permitted" activity
provision of section 56:9-5 (c) .259
The developer argued, however, that the ordinance amendments were violative of the MLUL and the NewJersey Constitution,
so that, according to plaintiff, if those contentions prevailed, the
amendments would not be "authorized or permitted." 26" The
court rejected that contention, explaining:
There is a well recognized distinction between an act of a governmental agency which is beyond its jurisdiction and an act
which is within the jurisdiction of the agency but is found to be
invalid. This distinction is pertinent in the interpretation of
N.J.S.A. 56:9-5(c). The "activity" of adopting a zoning ordinance is clearly within the jurisdiction of a planning board and a
governing body and hence "authorized or permitted" by law.
The mere fact that an ordinance or administrative regulation is
subject to being set aside by a court does not mean that a public
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260

Bally, 85 NJ. at 335, 426 A.2d at 1005.
135 N.J. 582, 641 A.2d 541 (1994).
Id. at 589-91, 641 A.2d at 544-45.
Id. at 598, 641 A.2d at 549.
205 NJ. Super. 273, 500 A.2d 757 (Law Div. 1984).
Id. at 289, 500 A.2d at 766.
Id.
Id. at 290, 500 A.2d at 766.
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official has exceeded his authority in its adoption.2" 1
In addition to the general state action protection of section
56:9-5(c), two of the more specific provisions of section 56:9-5(b)
have each been the subject of several reported cases. They are the
3
2 62
and public utilities.26
protections for insurers
The insurer provision has been invoked to bar a price-fixing
claim against Blue Cross,2 64 to prevent auto body shops from asserting that insurers conspired to keep repair prices too low, 26 5 and to
reject a challenge to an insurance regulation requiring a minimum
policyholder surplus as a prerequisite to an insurance company's
participation in a high-risk driver insurance program.2 66 The first
two of these cases used this provision to grant summary judgment,
thus demonstrating the usefulness of the "exemption" sections in
avoiding the need for unnecessary and often protracted antitrust
trials.
The public utility exemption was employed in Sudler v. Environment Disposal Corp.2" 7 to defeat a claim that a sewage disposal
plant franchised by the Board of Public Utility Commissioners had
improperly denied the plaintiff access to the sewage disposal system that connected with the plant, because the Board "expressly
permitted the activity that Sudler claims violates the Act."2 6 In
State v. Scioscia,'69 a criminal case, however, the court prevented
waste disposal companies who had conspired to divide up territories from using section 56:9-5(b) (3) of the Act to immunize their
conduct. While recognizing that the waste disposal industry was
261 Id., 500 A.2d at 767 (citation omitted). The court went on to note that most
land-use ordinances arguably have anticompetitive consequences, so that plaintiffs
view would create liability under the Act for every such ordinance. The need to avoid
the chilling effect of such exposure in connection with even desirable regulations was
viewed by the court as another reason to bar liability for the adoption of an ordinance. Id. at 290-91, 500 A.2d at 767.

262 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b) (4) (West 1989).

NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-5(b)(3) (West 1989).
Borland v. Bayonne Hosp., 122 N.J. Super. 387, 405-06, 300 A.2d 584, 593-94
(Ch. Div. 1973), affid, 136 N.J. Super. 60, 344 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 72 N.J.
152, 369 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977).
263
264

265

See Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 68, 75-

83, 401 A.2d 722, 725-29 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311

(App. Div. 1980).
266 See IFA Ins. Co. v. NewJersey Dep't of Ins., 195 NJ. Super. 200, 208-09, 478 A.2d
1203, 1207-08 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 99 NJ. 218, 491 A.2d 712 (1984).
267 219 N.J. Super. 52, 529 A.2d 1022 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 109 NJ. 56, 532 A.2d
1119 (1987).
268 Id. at 64, 529 A.2d at 1027.
269 200 N.J. Super. 28, 490 A.2d 327 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 NJ. 277, 501 A.2d
942 (1985).
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"pervasively regulated" by the Board of Public Utilities, the court
held that it would "totally eviscerate and subvert the legislative plan
were we to construe the exemption as precluding prosecution of
criminal restraints of commerce neither mandated nor permitted
by the BPU."2 7 °
Though not truly complete "exemptions," the protections of
section 56:9-5 are a powerful tool to defeat claims under the Act in
circumstances covered by that section. 2 7 1 Avoiding an unnecessary
and expensive trial by using those protections to obtain summary
judgment should be a first resort of anyone involved in cases falling
within the ambit of that section. 72
E.

Remedies

The Attorney General of the State of NewJersey, the state and
its political subdivisions and public agencies, and private parties all
may seek relief under the Act. 273 Injunctive relief, 274 treble dam270 Id. at 35-38, 490 A.2d at 331-33. The court thus implicitly construed the public
utility provision as a parallel to the general state action subsection, since the court's
reference to conduct "neither mandated nor permitted" was virtually identical to the
"directed, authorized or permitted" language of § 56:9-5(c). See supra note 240 and
accompanying text.
271 Perrucci & Mussomeli, supra note 2, perceived a trend in the federal courts
toward limiting the scope of comparable exemptions under federal law, and urged
that "[i]f New Jersey hopes to follow federal precedent, then the courts of this state
should carve away the expansive exemption section". It is unclear, however, how that
suggestion accords with the authors' earlier statements that federal decisions, especially those postdating the Act's enactment, cannot be given stare decisis effect in
state court. Id. at 141, 151 nn.1-3. The legislature's decision to adopt statutoly exemptions developed in federal courts by case law should be honored by state courts regardless of the trend of federal cases.
272 Presumably, certain other "exemptions" embodied in federal antitrust case law
will also apply under the Act. For example, the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine holds that
attempts to influence governmental action are exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless
they are "sham." See generally Professional Real Estate Inv., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961). The Noerr-Penningtondoctrine has already been applied in New Jersey in
a common law tort case that did not assert antitrust claims. Village Supermarket, Inc.
v. Mayfair Supermarkets, Inc., 269 N.J. Super. 224, 634 A.2d 1381 (Law Div. 1993).
That ruling foreshadows application of Noerr-Penningtonin an appropriate case under
the Act as well.
273 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-10(a) (West 1989) (Attorney General may seek injunctions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-10(b) (West 1989) (any person may seek injunction
against "threatened loss or damage to his property or business by a violation" of the
Act); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-12(a) (West 1989) (any person "injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation" of the Act may sue for damages and other monetary
relief); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-12(b) (West 1989) (Attorney General, State and subdivisions and agencies considered "persons" who may seek damages). For a discussion of

1996]

NEW JERSEY ANTITRUST ACT

677

2 5 reasonable
agesY,
attorneys' fees, 7 6 civil penalties,2 7 7 revocation
of a corporate offender's charter or right to do business in New
Jersey 2 78 and criminal fines and imprisonment 2 79 are among the
listed remedies.
The most controversial aspect of the remedial area has been
the "mandatory interdict" provision of section 56:9-11(b). That
clause, which has no analog in the federal statute,2 80 states that any
person convicted under section 56:9-11 (a):
is hereby denied the right and is hereby prohibited from managing or owning any business organization within this State, and
from serving as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, principal, manager,
stockholder owning 10% or more of the aggregate outstanding
capital stock of all classes of any corporation doing business in
this State, and all persons within this State, are hereby denied
the right to handle the goods of or in any manner deal with,
directly or indirectly, those persons, companies
or corporations
28 1
under the interdict specified herein.

In State v. Lawn King, Inc.,282 the court applied the mandatory
interdict to an individual defendant, while stating that the interdict
did not apply to the corporate defendant. 2 3 The convictions in
the standing requirements under the Act, see infra notes 305-24 and accompanying
text.
274 §§ 56:9-10(a) & (b).
275 §§ 56:9-12.
276 § 56:9-10(b); § 56:9-12(a). In Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., the court
held that the state could not recover attorneys' fees and costs for actions brought
under § 56:9-10, because the state was not defined as a "person" for that purpose.
Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 508, 515-18, 506 A.2d 381,38587 (App. Div. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 108 N.J. 123, 527 A.2d 1368 (1987).
277 § 56:9-10(c). For a comprehensive discussion of civil penalties under the Act,
see Kimmelman, 108 N.J. at 123, 527 A.2d at 1368, and Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (Ch. Div. 1972).
278 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-7 (West 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-8 (West 1989).
These remedies may be sought only by the Attorney General.
279 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-11(a) (West 1989). The Supreme Court of NewJersey has
indicated that the interests of the state and its citizens may often be better protected
by a civil suit rather than a criminal prosecution against alleged violators of the Act.
See State v. Lawn King, 84 NJ. 179, 215-16, 417 A.2d 1025, 1045 (1980).
280 State v. Lawn King, Inc., 152 N.J. Super. 333, 340, 377 A.2d 1214, 1218 (Law Div.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 169 N.J. Super. 346, 404 A.2d 1215 (App. Div. 1979),
affid, 84 N.J. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980).
281 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-11(b) (West 1989).
282 152 N.J. Super. 333, 340, 377 A.2d 1214 (Law Div. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
169 N.J. Super. 346, 404 A.2d 1215 (App. Div. 1979), affd, 84 N.J. 179, 417 A.2d 1025
(1980).
283 Id. at 338, 340-41, 377 A.2d at 1217, 1218. In an unpublished oral decision, the
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Lawn King were overturned on appeal,28 4 so that ruling was never

addressed by a higher court.
However, in State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 285 a law division judge held the mandatory interdict unconstitutional as violative of the bans against cruel and unusual punishment contained
in the United States and New Jersey constitutions.28 6 The court
considered the perpetual bar against participating in the management of any business to be severe and extreme, easily distinguishable from other statutes that preclude violators from certain
dealings for a limited time, and disproportionate in the particular
case before it, where the offenders had "led exemplary lives with
the exception of the instant offense."2 s 7 The court also rejected

the view of Lawn King that the interdict did not apply to business
entities. 2 8" Finally, the court severed the interdict from the remainder of the Act.289 As in
Lawn King, however, that decision was
29
never reviewed on appeal.

Arguments both in favor of and against the validity of the
mandatory interdict can be made. 29 1 However, any unconstitu-

tional effects of at least part of the interdict may be mitigated by
performing 'Judicial surgery" on the offending provision.2 9 2 Certainly, the first portion of the interdict, which precludes violators
from holding a managerial position in any business, does not deprive them of all realistic means of making a living, as the court in
trial court found the mandatory interdict constitutional. See Perrucci & Mussomeli,
supra note 2, at 174 & n.244.
284 See State v. Lawn King, 169 N.J. Super. 346, 404 A.2d 1215 (App. Div. 1979),
affd, 84 NJ. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980).
285 191 N.J. Super. 144, 465 A.2d 596 (Law Div. 1983), rev'd and remanded, 194 N.J.
Super. 90, 476 A.2d 301 (App. Div. 1984).
286 Id. at 153, 465 A.2d at 598. See U.S. CONST., amend. VIII; N.J. CONST., Art. 1,
12.
287 New Jersey Trade Waste, 191 N.J. Super. at 153-61, 465 A.2d at 601-05.
288 Id. at 149, 465 A.2d at 598. Given the language of the statute, which bans any
dealings with "persons, companies, or corporations under the interdict specified
herein," that ruling appears clearly correct.
289 Id. at 161, 465 A.2d at 605.
290 See New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 194 N.J. Super. at 92 n.2, 476 A.2d at 302 n.2
(App. Div. 1984); see also In re Scioscia, 216 NJ. Super. 644, 661 n.3, 524 A.2d 855, 863
n.3 (App. Div. 1987).
291 Perrucci & Mussomeli, supra note 2, at 174-75, discuss some of the arguments.
Those authors ultimately endorse an amendment to make the interdict discretionary.
See id. at 177.
292 See, e.g., Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 104, 462 A.2d 573, 582
(1983) (applying judicial surgery); see generally NYT Cable TV v. Homestead at Mansfield, Inc., 111 N.J. 21, 27-28, 543 A.2d 10, 14 (1988) (Handler, J., concurring) (discussing principles of engaging in 'judicial surgery").
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New Jersey Trade Waste contended. 9 3 The language of that portion
of N.J.S.A. 56:9-11 (b) can certainly be limited to control positions,
so that an offender would not be barred from becoming a "middle
manager," as long as he was not in control of the business. 9 4
The second part of the interdict, which forbids anyone to "in
any manner deal with, directly or indirectly, those persons, companies or corporations under the interdict specified herein," seems
far less easy to salvage. Construed literally, that provision would
mean that no one could even employ such offenders, as hiring
them in any capacity would constitute "dealing with" them.
The entire issue may be academic, however, because New Jersey
Trade Waste has stood for twelve years as a clear declaration of the
interdict's unconstitutionality. It is not clear whether that remedy
is still being pursued in cases brought under the Act.29 5 In light of
that, it certainly should come
as no surprise if a higher court ulti296
mately buries the interdict.
The Act includes at least two remedial mechanisms that appear to have been designed to encourage parties to settle rather
The court stated:
This statute not only prevents an individual from participating in a licensed profession, since those convicted of a crime are generally excluded from such practice, but also extends to prohibiting involvement
in any business at a management or ownership level, for the rest of the
defendant's life. The alternatives left to those convicted under the statute are few. They may take jobs as laborers, at probably substantially
reduced income; they may be eligible to work for a labor union; or they
may, of course, leave the state and start over. A defendant who takes a
job in the state is forever barred from promotion or advancement and is
prevented from using his earnings to obtain a significant interest in a
business enterprise. The statute deprives individuals of the right to apply their skills and abilities to better themselves and to provide for themselves and their families in the best way they are able.
New Jersey Trade Waste, 191 N.J. Super. at 150, 465 A.2d at 599.
294 Though the statutory bar includes serving as "manager," under the principle of
noscitur a sociis, which holds that a word's meaning is indicated by the words with
which it is associated, that word should be construed as meaning only a top manager,
of the type covered by the other categories from which offenders are barred. See
Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 220-21, 260 A.2d 839 (1970). That would obviate
much of the concern expressed in New Jersey Trade Waste while preserving the essence
of the interdict.
295 See, e.g., State v. Scioscia, 200 N.J. Super. 28, 32, 490 A.2d 327, 329 (App. Div.)
(finding defendants guilty of violating the Act, but making no mention of any imposition of the interdict), certif denied, 101 N.J. 277, 501 A.2d 942 (1985).
296 Cf Callen v. Sherman's, Inc., 92 N.J. 114, 133, 455 A.2d 1102, 1111-12 (1983)
(voiding Distraint Act and noting that the Chancery Division had declared it unconstitutional eight years earlier, so that "for over eight years landlords and their attorneys
have been on notice that distraint is a doubtful and risky procedure"). Several appellate cases have expressly declined to rule on this issue. See supra note 289.
293
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than to risk adverse final decisions.2 9 7 First, a party who obtains a
permanent injunction or damages may obtain not only reasonable
attorneys' fees, but "reasonable costs of suit," which are defined to
include, but not be limited to, "the expenses of discovery and document reproduction."298 This broad definition of "costs of suit" is
one that does not appear in other major New Jersey statutes that
shift costs and attorneys' fees.29 9 Given the extensive nature of discovery in antitrust cases, °° the "reasonable costs of suit" could be
substantial. 3 0 1 A party who settles does not face that liability.
Second, section 56:9-13 provides that a final judgment in any
civil or criminal action brought by the state for violation of the Act
"shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant pursuant to [section 56:9-12], as to all matters with respect to which said
judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties
thereto." 30 2 That provision is expressly inapplicable "to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been
taken."1 0 3 Although section 56:9-13 of the Act may not give private
parties the benefit of collateral estoppel in their own damage
suits, 3 ° 4 defendants have a powerful incentive to enter into consent
297 The mandatory interdict may have been intended for this purpose also. See
State v. NewJersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 194 N.J. Super. 90, 92, 476 A.2d 301, 302 (App.
Div. 1984) (noting that guilty plea was entered under statute other than Act "to avoid
burdening defendants with the 'interdict' sanctions of N.J.SA. 56:9-11(b)").
298 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-10(b) (West 1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-12(a) (West
1989).
299 For example, the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 1989),
the Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27.1 (West 1994), the Environmental Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-10(a) (West 1989 and 1995 Supp.), and
the Oppressed Minority Shareholder Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(10) (West
1995), all contain provisions to shift attorneys' fees or certain costs, such as expert
fees. None of these statutes expressly shifts all discovery costs to the losing party.
300 See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.
1978) (stating that "antitrust trials often encompass a great deal of expensive and
time consuming discovery").
301 No case has yet decided whether an award of discovery expenses is required as
part of "reasonable costs of suit." The Act says only that such costs "may"include
discovery expenses. Sections 56:9-10(b) and 56:9-12(a). Thus, while reasonable costs
of suit must be awarded, because the same sections of the Act say they "shall" be, it is
unclear whether discovery expenses must be included in all cases. See Bell v. Western
Employers Ins. Co., 173 N.J. Super. 60, 65, 413 A.2d 363, 366 (App. Div. 1980) (finding that where the legislature used "shall" and "may" in the same sentence dealing
with the same subject, the court must assume that the change was intentional).
302 The final clause of § 56:9-13 makes clear, however, that no such effect is given to
damage suits brought under § 56:9-12.
303 Id.
304 Collateral estoppel can allow not only a successful litigant, but other parties in
later litigation, to treat as established in their own lawsuits against a particular party all
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judgments or decrees before testimony is taken, rather than sub-

jecting themselves to suits by private parties whose cases are substantially made by an adverse verdict in the state's action. 05
F.

Standing

Under federal antitrust law, not every claim that is literally en30 6
compassed by an antitrust statute confers standing to sue.
Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that (1) he has sustained
"antitrust injury," meaning "injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the
defendants' acts unlawful,"30 7 and (2) he is otherwise a proper
plaintiff.30 ' In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,3 °9 the United States Supreme Court
listed the nature and directness of the injury claimed, the availabilfacts actually and necessarily decided against that same party in a prior case. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); McIntyre v. ILB Inv.
Corp., 172 N.J. Super. 415, 412 A.2d 810 (Law Div. 1979). Because § 56:9-13 makes
those facts only prima facie evidence, which could be successfully rebutted, the statute
falls short of conferring collateral estoppel effect. It does, however, substantially
lighten the burden of private plaintiffs in proving a case against a defendant after the
state has obtained a judgment covered by that section.
305 Perhaps as a result of this provision, a number of consent judgments entered
before any testimony was taken have been reported. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Risalvato,
1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,971 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. June 2, 1983) (concerning
gasoline retailers who agreed not to conspire to fix prices); Zazzali v. New Jersey Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 1981-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 64,376 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. Nov. 16,
1981) (concerning pharmacies that agreed not to fix prescription drug prices, disseminate information relating to price-fixing, establish fee schedules, or induce adherence to specific fees); Zazzali v. B&B Beverage Co., Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
64,130 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. June 17, 1981) (concerning beer distributors who gave
up rights under an agreement that illegally created exclusive territories); Degnan v.
Stokes Dairy, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 63,198 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. Feb. 21,
1980) (barring dairies from fixing prices, allocating markets, submitting collusive
bids, and exchanging price information); New Jersey v. Allan's Towing Serv., Inc.,
1978-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 62,004 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. Apr. 20, 1978) (banning
towing companies from agreeing on prices or exchanging price information); New
Jersey v. Nurses Private Duty Registry, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 61,809 (N.J.
Super. Ch. Div. Dec. 12, 1977) (barring nurses' registry from making agreements to
fix prices or generating fee schedules or other mechanisms to allow members to fix
prices).
306 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537 (1983).
307 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986) (quoting
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
308 Id. at 110 n.5 ("A showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish standing under § 4 [of the Sherman Act], because a party may have
suffered antitrust injury but may not be a proper plaintiff under § 4 for other
reasons.").
309

459 U.S. 519 (1983).
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ity of less remotely affected plaintiffs, and the judicial manageability of an action filed by particular parties3 1 0 as factors to consider in
determining whether a plaintiff is a proper one. 311 Those factors
are to be considered regardless of whether the alleged antitrust
offense is a per se violation or another type of wrong. 1 2
Standing cases under the Act seem to have largely paralleled
the federal standards, though such congruence is not required.3 13

The cases have stated that the Act protects competition rather than
competitors, 1 4 thus seemingly incorporating the federal rationale
for the requirement of antitrust injury, which "ensures that the
harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place, and ...

pre-

vents losses that stem from competition from supporting suits by
private plaintiffs for either damages or equitable relief."31 There
has not yet been an explicit adoption, however, of the term "antitrust injury," with all its federal baggage, as a criterion under the
Act.
One published case appears to have decided that the Associated
General Contractors factors for a proper plaintiff apply under the
Act. In Van Natta Mechanical Corp. v. DiStaulo,31 6 plaintiff, a
mechanical subcontractor, had been told by a major contractor,
DiStaulo, with whom plaintiff dealt extensively, that plaintiff must
cease dealing with a competing contractor or lose any future opportunity to bid on DiStaulo's jobs. Plaintiff filed suit for tortious
310 This includes such things as the potential for duplicative recoveries or complex
problems of damages apportionment. Id. at 545.
311 Id. at 538-45; Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111 n.6. Associated GeneralContractorsinvolved a
claim for treble damages. These factors also apply to a case where only injunctive
relief is sought, but not necessarily in the same way as in a treble damages action. Id.
312 See Arco v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328, 341-45 (1990). For a discussion of the
difference between per se violations and other violations, see supra notes 31-67 and
accompanying text.
313 See infra notes 313-24 and accompanying text.
314 See Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 68, 88,
401 A.2d 722, 732 (Law Div. 1979), affd, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (App. Div.
1980); see also Boardwalk Properties, Inc. v. BPHC Acquisition, Inc., 253 N.J. Super.
515, 530, 602 A.2d 733, 741 (App. Div. 1991) (same, though no standing issue
presented).
315 Arco, 495 U.S. at 338, 342 ("The antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of
competition, not competitors.") (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962)).
316 277 N.J. Super. 175, 190, 649 A.2d 399, 407 (App. Div. 1994). Though the court
did not cite Associated General Contractors or any other United States Supreme Court
case, it relied on Eighth Circuit case law that in turn cited Associated General Contractors. See id., 649 A.2d at 407 (citing Midwest Communications v. Minnesota Twins, 779
F.2d 444, 450 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986)).
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interference and also asserted a monopoly claim under the Act.
The appellate division, applying the Associated General Contractors
factors, held that plaintiff lacked standing to raise the antitrust
claim, because it was not a target of the allegedly monopolistic ac7
tivity and its injury was not direct enough to afford standing.'1
The Associated General Contractorsfactors appear to be prudential and discretionary ones, born of the concern that too many
speculative lawsuits will burden the courts, expose parties to duplicative recoveries, and reduce the effectiveness of the treble damages remedy.3 1 8 Although Van Natta had the right to apply those
factors under the Act, to the extent that this aspect of antitrust
standing is informed by general federal standing law,3 19 which is
based on the federal constitutional "case or controversy" requirement32 0 and is more stringent than New Jersey's own standing
rules, 32' other courts confronting these same issues under the Act
could legitimately choose not to incorporate the "proper plaintiff'
tests into New Jersey's antitrust standing rules.
To this point, the New Jersey cases have set up the requirement of section 56:9-12 that a person be "injured in his business or
property" 322 as the primary determinant of standing. That language is identical to the phrasing of the comparable federal statute.3 2 3 In reliance on that language, NewJersey courts have denied
standing to associations of businesses (even though their members
might have had standing on their own), because the associations
were not conducting businesses.3 2 4 In contrast, consumers who
have shown injury to their "property" in the form of increased costs
3 17 Id.
318 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 (1983); Asso-

ciated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 544-545 (1983).
319 See Associated GeneralContractors, 459 U.S. at 535 n.31 (noting that "[h]arm to the
antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutionalstanding requirement of injury in fact").
320 See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
321 See Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107-08, 274
A.2d 433, 437-38 (1971).
322 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-12 (West 1989); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-10(b) (West

1989) (requiring "threatened loss or damage to [the] property or business" of a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under the Act).

323 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
324 See Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 68, 73,
401 A.2d 722, 724 (Law Div. 1979), affd, 176 NJ. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (App. Div.

1980); New Jersey Chiropractic Soc'y v. Radiological Soc'y, 156 NJ. Super. 365, 369,
383 A.2d 1182, 1184 (Ch. Div. 1978); NewJersey Optometric Ass'n v. Hillman-Kohan
Eyeglasses, Inc., 144 NJ. Super. 411, 426, 365 A.2d 956, 964 (Ch. Div. 1976), affd, 160
N.J. Super. 81, 388 A.2d 1299 (App. Div. 1978).
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for X-rays have been afforded standing to assert claims that medical societies, hospitals, and radiologists had conspired to monopolize trade by refusing to provide X-rays to customers referred by
chiropractors.

325

The "injury to business or property" criterion parallels federal
law, and is, by itself, sufficient to ensure that only persons with real
injury may file antitrust lawsuits. If, however, other New Jersey
courts follow Van Natta by incorporating the additional, prudential
limitations of federal law as well, New Jersey antitrust standing law
will substantially emulate federal law in most respects.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the most part, New Jersey courts have followed federal antitrust substantive law in construing the Act. However, New Jersey
courts are not bound to adhere to federal procedural requirements. Instead, as they have in fact sometimes done, New Jersey
courts may choose their own procedural path. Practitioners should
be cognizant of NewJersey's treatment of antitrust issues, both substantive and procedural, especially if they have a choice between
filing suit in state court under the Act or in federal court under the
federal antitrust laws.

325 See New Jersey Chiropractic,156 NJ. Super. at 370-71, 383 A.2d at 1185. Not every
"injury" to a consumer, however, suffices to confer standing. In Monmouth Real Estate,
the court found that a consumer who alleged that he was inconvenienced by the defendant's allegedly monopolistic actions lacked standing because he had not shown
any injury other than "de minimis additional travel expenses by automobile." Monmouth Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Manville Foodland, Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 262, 272, 482
A.2d 186, 191 (App. Div. 1984), certif denied, 99 N.J. 234, 491 A.2d 722 (1985).

